Marquette University Law School

Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2010

If you Speak Up, Must you Stand Down: Caperton
and Its Limits
Richard M. Esenberg
Marquette University Law School, richard.esenberg@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Richard M. Esenberg, If you Speak Up, Must you Stand Down: Caperton and Its Limits, 45 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 1287 (2010) © 2010 by the Wake Forest Law Review Association, Inc.
Repository Citation
Esenberg, Richard M., "If you Speak Up, Must you Stand Down: Caperton and Its Limits" (2010). Faculty Publications. Paper 124.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/124

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

W04_ESENBERG

11/11/2010 11:44:12 PM

IF YOU SPEAK UP, MUST YOU STAND DOWN:
CAPERTON AND ITS LIMITS
Richard M. Esenberg*

. . . The hungry Judges soon the Sentence sign,
And Wretches hang that Jury-men may Dine . . . .

1

INTRODUCTION
The idea of judicial impartiality is an old one. Chief Justice of
the Indiana Supreme Court Randall Shepard reminds us that, in the
book of Deuteronomy, Moses is said to have instructed judges of the
tribes of Israel that they “‘shalt not respect persons’” nor “‘take a
gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words
2
of the righteous.’” The author of Leviticus cautions that “you shall
not be partial to the poor or defer to the great, but in righteousness
3
shall you judge your neighbor.” King Alfred the Great required not
only that magistrates be literate, but regarded judges who “slay folk
4
by false judgments” to be guilty of homicide. In one year, he had
5
The Lex
forty-four judges hanged for such false judgments.
Visigothorum (Visigothic Code) required that judges who had ruled
falsely due, not to ignorance, but to partiality, cupidity, or for the
sake of profit would be required to make restitution to the wronged
6
party. If unable to make restitution, the judge was to “be delivered
as a slave to him to whom he is indebted, or, after having been
7
exposed in public . . . receive fifty lashes.”

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. ALEXANDER POPE, The Rape of the Lock, in 2 POEMS OF ALEXANDER
POPE: THE RAPE OF THE LOCK AND OTHER POEMS 144, 170 (Geoffrey Tillotson ed.,
Routledge 1993) (1940).
2. Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech Restraint and Liberty in
Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1060–61 (1996) (quoting
Deuteronomy 16:19 (King James)).
3. Leviticus 19:15 (Revised Standard Version).
4. Shepard, supra note 2, at 1061 n.3 (quoting THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES
166 (William Joseph Whitaker ed., 1895)).
5. Id.
6. THE VISIGOTHIC CODE bk. II, tit. I, ¶ XIX, at 28 (S.P. Scott ed. & trans.,
1910).
7. Id.; accord M.H. Hoeflich, Regulation of Judicial Misconduct from Late
Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 79, 92 (1984) (citing
provisions of the Visigothic Code that punish judicial misconduct such as
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8

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Supreme Court
considered a less extreme approach to the problem of judicial bias.
The Court has long recognized that the constitutional guarantee of
due process may require recusal of judges holding an interest in the
9
outcome of a case. But prior to Caperton, the application of this
requirement had been limited to cases in which a judge had an
10
individual or official pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case or
11
was, in some sense, acting as both the judge and prosecutor.
Caperton moved beyond this, declaring a generalized due process
duty to recuse in circumstances in which a judge has an interest
12
A five-tothat creates an “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”
four majority held that a successful judicial candidate’s potential
“debt of gratitude” to a corporate litigant whose CEO had spent a
13
large amount of money in support of his election required recusal.
The majority and dissent disagreed about whether the decision
14
They
would launch satellite litigation seeking recusal of judges.
15
also disagreed over the need for a more specific standard. In my
view, there is more potential for mischief than the majority
recognized. The absence of clear guidance may very well lead
bribery).
8. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
9. Id. at 2259–62.
10. Id. at 2259–61; see, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,
816–17, 820–25 (1986) (finding a due process violation when an Alabama
Supreme Court Justice sat on a case while he was the lead plaintiff in a nearly
identical case pending in the state’s lower courts); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57, 57–62 (1972) (finding a due process violation when the mayor, who
was in charge of revenue production and law enforcement, sat in judgment of
the petitioner who had been charged with two traffic offenses, the funds of
which would go to the municipal coffers); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514–20,
531–32 (1927) (finding a due process violation when a mayor served as village
judge and received supplemental pay from fines he imposed).
11. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261–62; see, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,
400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971) (“[A] defendant in criminal contempt proceedings
should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the
contemnor.”); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 134–35, 139 (1955) (holding that
the petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial judge
participated in the charging decision).
12. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
13. Id. at 2256, 2262, 2265–67.
14. See id. at 2265 (“Massey and its amici predict that various adverse
consequences will follow from recognizing a constitutional violation here—
ranging from a flood of recusal motions to unnecessary interference with
judicial elections. We disagree.”); id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“But I
believe that opening the door to recusal claims under the Due Process
Clause . . . will itself bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and
diminish the confidence of the American people in the fairness and integrity of
their courts.”); id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principal consequence
of today’s decision is to create vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law
that can be raised in all litigated cases in (at least) those 39 States that elect
their judges.”).
15. Id. at 2267–69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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litigants to play the Caperton card, particularly in high-profile cases
before multimember appellate courts. This may well, as the dissent
feared, disrupt the operation of state courts and undermine the
public confidence in the judicial process that the majority sought to
16
preserve.
While Caperton itself provides little guidance, it is highly
unlikely that the Court intended to usher in a constitutionally
mandated regime of aggressive recusal requirements. The Court
repeatedly referred to the facts before it as “rare,” “extraordinary,”
17
I argue that Caperton’s scope and likely
and “extreme.”
application can be informed by the Court’s recent decisions on
judicial campaign speech and campaign finance regulation. These
cases suggest some limits on a due process duty of recusal that
Caperton itself did not provide. Part I of this Article considers the
Caperton case and the likelihood that it will have legs, leading to
more frequent attempts by litigants to seek the recusal of potentially
“unfriendly” judges. Part II examines the Court’s recent cases on
judicial campaign speech and campaign finance regulation,
attempting to discern what those cases mean for the interplay
between the right of free speech in judicial campaigns and the desire
for judicial impartiality. Part III suggests some potential guidelines
for the application of Caperton.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the problems
discussed here are most salient with respect to multimember lawdeveloping courts. Candidates and aspirants to such courts are
most likely to attract the type of support or to engage in the type of

16. Id. at 2267, 2274.
17. See, e.g., id. at 2256 (“[Justice Benjamin] received campaign
contributions in an extraordinary amount from, and through the efforts of,
[litigant].”); id. at 2262 (“Though not a bribe or criminal influence, Justice
Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to [litigant] for his
extraordinary efforts to get him elected.”); id. at 2263 (“Not every campaign
contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires
a judge’s recusal, but this is an exceptional case.”); id. at 2265 (“[T]he fact
remains that [litigant’s] extraordinary contributions were made at a time when
he had a vested stake in the outcome [of his pending case].”); id. (“On these
extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level.”);
id. (“Our decision today addresses an extraordinary situation where the
Constitution requires recusal.”); id. (“The facts now before us are extreme by
any measure.”); id. (“It is true that extreme cases often test the bounds of
established legal principles . . . . But it is also true that extreme cases are more
likely to cross constitutional limits . . . .”); id. at 2265–66 (“In each [prior
recusal] case the Court dealt with extreme facts that created an
unconstitutional probability of bias . . . . The Court was careful to distinguish
the extreme facts of the cases before it from those interests that would not rise
to a constitutional level.”); id. at 2266 (recognizing that the Court was not
“flooded” with motions after the prior recusal cases, which was “perhaps due in
part to the extreme facts those standards sought to address”); id. at 2267
(holding that litigant’s contributions presented one of the “rare instances” that
requires judicial recusal).
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debate that may lead to calls for recusals. At the same time,
recusal—by disabling those chosen by the electorate or the
appointing authorities from participation in the law-development
process—may create greater tensions between rights of free speech
and association and the logic of the applicable judicial selection
mechanism.
I. CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO.
18

Some have seen Caperton as an instance of life imitating art —
in this case, John Grisham’s novel The Appeal, in which shady
corporate interests locate and support a Manchurian candidate for
the Mississippi Supreme Court who will rule in their favor in a
19
pending case. While the comparison may be closer in legend than
reality, Caperton was—in many respects—an extraordinary case.
A.

The Caperton Result

A jury had “found . . . A.T. Massey Coal Co. and its
affiliates . . . liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment,
20
It
and tortuous interference with existing contractual relations.”
21
awarded plaintiffs fifty million dollars in damages.
After the verdict, but before the appeal, Justice Warren
McGraw ran for reelection to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
22
Appeals. He was opposed by a Charleston attorney named Brent
23
Don Blankenship, CEO of Massey, heavily supported
Benjamin.
Benjamin’s challenge.
In addition to the maximum legal
contribution of one thousand dollars to the Benjamin campaign
itself, Blankenship independently spent half-a-million dollars in
24
support of Benjamin’s candidacy. Most significantly, Blankenship
donated nearly two-and-a-half million dollars to “And For The Sake
Of The Kids,” an independent political organization formed under 26
U.S.C. § 527 that supported Benjamin. Blankenship’s contribution
constituted over two-thirds of the total amount raised by the
25
organization. His three million dollars in aggregate contributions
and expenditures “[was] more than the total amount spent by all
other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by
26
It was alleged that “Blankenship
Benjamin’s own committee.”
spent $1 million more than the total amount spent by the campaign
18. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA
TODAY (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/news/Washington/2009-02-16
-grisham-court_N.htm.
19. Id. See generally JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008).
20. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (majority opinion).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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27

committees of both candidates combined.”
Benjamin won the election with a bit more than 53% of the
28
While the proceedings in Massey’s appeal in the Caperton
vote.
case were complicated, the bottom line is that Benjamin refused to
recuse himself and voted with the majority as the verdict against
29
The Caperton
Massey was overturned by a three-to-two vote.
plaintiffs sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging that
30
The Court granted
their due process rights had been violated.
review and, by a five-to-four vote, reversed the decision of the West
31
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
As noted above, although the Court repeatedly referred to the
32
it
facts before it as “rare,” “extraordinary,” and “extreme,”
announced a broadly formulated due process right, suggesting that
courts must undertake an inquiry to determine “whether the
average judge in [the same] position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or
33
This
whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”
inquiry is designed to be objective, as the test of recusal is “not
34
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased.” Rather, recusal
may be required when “‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of
actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the
35
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’”
In the context of a judicial election in which one party to the
case is claimed to have supported a judicial candidate in a way that
creates the appearance of bias, recusal may be constitutionally
mandated when a contributor with a personal stake in a case “had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on
the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign
36
when the case was pending or imminent.”
Applying that principle to the facts before it, the Court said that
“[t]he inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent
37
effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.” In the
case of Massey and Justice Benjamin, it concluded that, even if
Blankenship’s support may not have been a necessary and sufficient

27. Id. Exorbitant expenditures on judicial candidates are likely to become
more and more common. See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
28. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
29. Id. at 2257–58.
30. Id. at 2259.
31. Id. at 2257–59.
32. See supra note 17.
33. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
36. Id. at 2263–64.
37. Id. at 2264.
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cause of Justice Benjamin’s victory, its influence was “significant
38
The Court emphasized “[t]he temporal
and disproportionate.”
relationship between the campaign contributions, the justice’s
election, and the pendency of the case,” noting that “[a]lthough there
is no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement, the fact remains that
Blankenship’s extraordinary contributions were made at a time
39
when he had a vested stake in the outcome.” Given the size of the
contributions, they “would offer a possible temptation to the
average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
40
and true.” In this case, Justice Benjamin—or, more accurately, a
judge in Justice Benjamin’s position—would feel a debt of gratitude
toward Blankenship for his extraordinary campaign efforts on his
behalf.
The Court stated that it did not expect a deluge of recusal
41
motions, but it suggested no further limiting principles on the
general due process duty of recusal. Noting that a flood of recusal
motions had not followed the Court’s earlier recusal decisions,
Justice Kennedy observed that “[c]ourts proved quite capable of
42
applying the standards to less extreme situations.” Because states
can and do “‘adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process
requires,’” he expressed the view that “most disputes over
disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution”
and that the standard adopted in Caperton will be “confined to rare
43
instances.”
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts noted that, prior to Caperton,
the Court had recognized only two instances in which due process
might require recusal: “when the judge has a financial interest in
the outcome of the case, and when the judge is trying a defendant
44
He criticized expansion of the
for certain criminal contempts.”
requirement to a case in which the judge’s interest is more
45
This, in his view, expanded the concept in a way not
indirect.
readily translated into a “judicially discernible and manageable
46
He posed forty questions left unanswered by the
standard.”
47
majority opinion. Of course, few decisions of any significance fail
to leave unanswered questions, and traditional judicial practice
hesitates to decide more than is necessary to dispose of the case at

38. Id. at 2263–64.
39. Id. at 2264–65.
40. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 2265.
42. Id. at 2266.
43. Id. at 2267 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,
794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
44. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2272. “[T]he standard the majority articulates—‘probability of
bias’—fails to provide clear, workable guidance for future cases.” Id. at 2269.
47. Id. at 2269–72.
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hand. But, for the dissenters, the Court had provided no means by
48
which these questions might be answered.
Justice Scalia, writing separately, agreed with Chief Justice
Roberts:
What above all else is eroding public confidence in the Nation’s
judicial system is the perception that litigation is just a game,
that the party with the most resourceful lawyer can play it to
win, that our seemingly interminable legal proceedings are
wonderfully self-perpetuating but incapable of delivering realworld justice.
The Court’s opinion will reinforce that
perception, adding to the vast arsenal of lawyerly gambits
49
what will come to be known as the Caperton claim.

Chief Justice Roberts expressed his fear that “opening the door
to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for an amorphous
‘probability of bias,’ will itself bring our judicial system into
undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the American
50
people in the fairness and integrity of their courts.” He expressed
51
the hope that he will be proven wrong.
B.

Caperton’s Future

Time will tell whether Chief Justice Roberts’s fear or hope is
realized. There are reasons—based on Caperton’s rationale and the
evolving character of judicial elections—to suspect that Caperton
motions will be more prevalent than the majority assumed. As
several commentators have observed, Justice Kennedy may have
52
been trying to resolve a “hard case” without making “bad law” by
implying that the Caperton decision was “good-for-this-day-and-this53
train-only.” It may be that, for Justice Kennedy, the potential for
bias is like pornography was for Justice Stewart—he knows it when
54
he sees it. There are certainly times when such reasoning may be
48. Id. at 2267.
49. Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley A. Smith, The Caperton
Caper and the Kennedy Conundrum, 2009 CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 319, 319
(“Caperton v. Massey Coal typifies the old maxim that hard cases make bad law.
In Caperton, the Supreme Court created a new, largely unworkable standard
for judicial recusal, then elevated it to a matter of constitutional due process.”
(footnote omitted)).
53. Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons
of Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80, 94 (2009).
54. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced within [‘hard-core pornography’]; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that.” (emphasis added)). One of my
copanelists at a conference held shortly after the issuance of Caperton
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55

the best we can do.
One commentator has argued that Caperton motions will be
rare because they will largely be self-executing—a lawyer will be
hesitant to file Caperton motions when a judge fails to voluntarily
recuse himself because “the lawyer may safely assume that the
56
Given
judge is predisposed to deny the formal recusal motion.”
Caperton’s emphasis of the “extreme” nature of its facts, success at
57
the appellate level will be “rare.” Further, review of the failure of
state supreme court justices to recuse themselves could only occur in
58
the United States Supreme Court, an unlikely event given the
rarity with which certiorari is granted. All of this should add up to
a reluctance of lawyers to play the recusal “gambit,” reflected in the
59
adage that “[w]hen you strike at a king, you must kill him.”
But it is far from clear that the Caperton facts were as extreme
or unusual as the majority assumed them to be. As the dissent and
a number of commentators have observed, there were other large
sums of money being spent on the Benjamin-McGraw race, much of
it by interest groups who could be expected to have matters before
60
Although Blankenship’s spending may have helped
the court.
suggested that Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself was worthy of
treatment on a recurrent segment on Saturday Night Live called “Really!?! with
Seth & Amy” in which Seth Meyer and Amy Poehler make fun of what they
take to be obviously poor decisions. See, for example, the show’s treatment of
Representative Joseph Wilson’s outburst during a speech to Congress by
President Obama. Saturday Night Live: Weekend Update: Thursday (NBC
television broadcast Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.nbc.com/Saturday
-night-live/video/update-thursday-part-3/1158379/?__cid=thefilter (“Hey, Joe!
Yelling ‘You lie!’ would be rude to a valet or a waiter, so, maybe don’t yell it at
the President! Really! And, also, next time, can I suggest ‘You’re a liar!’? ‘You
lie!’ sounds like a toddler or someone who just learned English. I mean,
really!”).
55. I have argued that this may be the only way to understand and apply
the Supreme Court’s recent adoption of a “plausibility” standard for assessing
the adequacy of pleadings under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), and Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). See Richard Esenberg, To Iqbal
or Not To Iqbal?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 12, 2010, 9:52 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/03/to-iqbal-or-not-to-iqbal.html.
Additionally, similar reasoning has been adopted in at least one case in
England. See Cadogan v. Morris, [1998] EWCA (Civ) 1671 (Eng.) (referring to
“the well known elephant test[, which] is difficult to describe, but you know it
when you see it”).
56. Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton,
60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 234–35 (2010).
57. Id. at 235.
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006).
59. Green, supra note 56, at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). Green
attributes the quote to Ralph Waldo Emerson. Id. at 235 & n.39. A more
modern version can be attributed to the character Omar Little in the HBO
series The Wire. The Wire: Lessons (HBO television broadcast July 28, 2002)
(“Ayo. Lesson here ‘Bey. You come at the king, you best not miss.”).
60. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009)
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Benjamin win, the race was not particularly close, and there were a
61
myriad of other factors that could have led to Benjamin’s victory.
In fact, the amount of money spent on state supreme court and
62
other judicial races has been increasing exponentially. It is not at
all unusual for discrete organizations—say plaintiffs’ lawyers, public
employee unions, or insurance and business groups—to spend
63
If the Caperton motion is
comparable sums on statewide races.
64
going to become, in Justice Scalia’s words, a “lawyerly gambit,”
contemporary judicial races seem likely to provide a target-rich
environment.
65
Although there are strategic reasons to avoid recusal motions,
lawyers may also rationally conclude that the likelihood of obtaining
a particular judge’s vote is sufficiently remote that an attempt to
remove her from the case is a better play. This is particularly likely
to be the case in multimember law-developing courts in which the
outcome is less likely to be clear and the campaign cycle is more
likely to have included the type of spending and advertising that
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘Consumers for Justice’—an independent group that
received large contributions from the plaintiffs’ bar—spent approximately $2
million in this race.”); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the
Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 275–
76 (2010) (listing various organizations that contributed money to defeat Justice
McGraw).
61. See Andrew L. Frey & Jeffrey A. Berger, A Solution in Search of a
Problem: The Disconnect Between the Outcome in Caperton and the
Circumstances of Justice Benjamin’s Election, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 279, 282–85
(2010) (attributing Benjamin’s victory to factors outside of solely financial
support); Rotunda, supra note 60, at 272–76 (listing additional factors that
contributed to Benjamin’s victory). For example, Justice McGraw refused to
grant media interviews or to debate his opponent. Frey & Berger, supra, at
284. He gave a widely publicized speech that came to be known as the “Scream
at Racine,” in which he claimed that Republicans, not Democrats, “gave” the
electorate abortion and opposition to school prayer, and that the U.S. Supreme
Court had “approved gay marriage.” Rotunda, supra note 60, at 274–75. Of
those state newspapers that endorsed candidates for the office, all but one
endorsed Benjamin. Id. at 273.
62. See JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS IN THE GREAT LAKES STATES, 2000–2008, at 3 (Jess Rutledge ed.,
2008) (“Between 1999 and 2007, candidates for America’s highest courts have
raised over $165 million, a remarkable jump from the $62 million raised
between 1993 and 1998.”); JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL YOUNG,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 10
(2008) (“Winning candidates who did not accept public financing raised an
average of more than $650,000 in 2004, up 45% from 2002’s average of
$450,000.”); David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
265, 267–68 (2008) (“Contributions have skyrocketed; interest groups, political
parties, and mass media advertising play an increasingly prominent role . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)).
63. SAMPLE, POZEN & YOUNG, supra note 62, at 10.
64. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Kelly M. Falls, Note, A Quorum of One: Redefining Recusal Standards
in the Federal Trade Commission, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 705, 714 (2006).
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seems most likely to lead to a Caperton issue.
1.

Caperton Unbounded

All Caperton tells us is that recusal may be constitutionally
required whenever there is a “potential for bias” that, when viewed
objectively, may cause a judge to fail to “hold the balance nice, clear
66
potentially
and true.”
This is a rather protean standard,
applicable in a variety of ways. It is unclear, for example, why
Caperton’s standard would be limited only to large campaign
expenditures or contributions by a particular litigant. A successful
judicial candidate might also be thought to owe a “debt of gratitude”
to an advocacy organization or interest group that has made
independent expenditures on her behalf and that, while not a party
to a subsequent case, appears as an amicus or is otherwise strongly
67
Given Justice Kennedy’s capacious
interested in the outcome.
standard, it is possible to argue that a “debt of gratitude” to an
important supporter or group of supporters might be repaid not only
by fealty to a position that serves a supporter’s pecuniary interest,
68
As we will see, there is
but also his or her ideological interest.
more robust evidence that “ideological” or “political” interests affect
judicial decision making—even when they are nothing more than a
recognition of how the electorate might respond—more than
69
contributions.
Nor is it clear that support from an interest group must be
formal, organized, or involve concerted or coordinated actions by the
participants. If a judicial candidate has enjoyed outsized support
from trial lawyers or business executives, litigants might argue—
and a court might hold—that there is a “potential” for bias in favor
66. See Rotunda, supra note 60, at 256 (“Sometimes a judge must disqualify
himself because of campaign contributions or independent expenditures by an
individual who is not a lawyer or party before the Court but has an interest in a
case that is before the court. The question is when? Caperton does not answer
that with any precision, except to say that it all depends.” (footnotes omitted)).
67. Following the 2007 Supreme Court election in Wisconsin, there were
motions and public calls for the recusal of newly elected Justice Annette Ziegler
in a case addressing the applicability of the sales tax to “customized” software.
See Editorial, Judicial Conflicts: Step Aside in this Case, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 2007, at 12A. Hundreds of millions of dollars were at stake.
A business lobbyist group, known as Wisconsin Manufacturers Commerce
(“WMC”), had spent over two million dollars in support of Justice Ziegler’s
candidacy and had filed an amicus brief in the case. Patrick Marley & Stacy
Forster, Van Hollen Has Ties to Case: Business Lobby Spent Millions on
Attorney General, Ziegler in Elections, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 30, 2007,
at 1B. Justice Ziegler declined to recuse herself and ultimately wrote the
majority opinion in favor of the position supported by WMC. Wis. Dep’t of
Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 754 N.W.2d 95 (Wis. 2008).
68. See infra notes 84–95 and accompanying text (discussing the recusal
motions filed against Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Michael Gableman as a
result of his perceived ideological opposition to criminal defendants).
69. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
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of the interests of a group that has disproportionately supported the
70
candidate’s election.
Like Chief Justice Roberts, we can go on. There is no obvious
reason why “debts of gratitude” must be limited to contributions and
expenditures. There are other forms of support that might come
from a potential litigant or interested party—endorsements of law
enforcement or the organizational efforts of unions and other
advocacy organizations—that might be seen to offer comparable
71
advantages to a favored candidate. Professors Stephen Hoersting
and Bradley Smith argue that newspaper endorsements can be
72
worth an increase in voter share of one to five percentage points.
Further, there may, in fact, be no need for “support” at all. It seems
just as plausible that a “potential for bias” may arise from a “desire
for vengeance” against a candidate’s opponents as from a “debt of
73
gratitude” to her supporters.
Nor is it clear, under Caperton, that the due process problems
that may be presented by support of a judicial aspirant are limited
to elections. Indeed, it seems plausible to believe that a “debt of
gratitude” may be owed not only to those who have helped to elect a
judge, but to those who have appointed him or helped to secure his
74
appointment in states where that is the route to the bench.

70. For example, Texas Supreme Court races were often claimed to be
tainted by large individual contributions from numerous plaintiffs’ lawyers. See
Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Plaintiffs Firms Bow Out as Big Campaign Donors,
TEX. LAW., Mar. 9, 1998, at 1.
71. See Hoersting & Smith, supra note 52, at 336 (“[Caperton’s] logic can be
extended to find ‘bias’ in any of a range of other independent political activity,
in multiple forms and from multiple actors, long recognized as vital to
democracy. A group of community organizers that work to get out the vote in
neighborhoods that disproportionately support a candidate would ‘benefit’ that
candidate and may make him ‘grateful.’”)
72. Id. at 337 & n.73.
73. See id. at 338 (“Whatever recusal standard would apply to Justice
Benjamin would presumably apply equally to his opponent, for in a system of
winner-take-all elections, whether the $3 million was spent independently to
support the judicial candidate or to oppose him matters little to the perceived
impartiality of the judge.”).
74. Even in states that elect their judiciary, many judges are initially
appointed to fill a vacancy. For example, in my home state of Wisconsin,
Governor Jim Doyle appointed Louis Butler to replace Justice Diane Sykes, who
had been confirmed as a judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. It was
widely speculated that Democrats agreed not to oppose Judge Sykes’s
nomination because it would give Governor Doyle, a Democrat, an opportunity
to appoint her replacement. See Annie L. Owens, Comment, “All Politics Is
Local”: The Politics of Merit-Based Federal Judicial Selection in Wisconsin, 88
MARQ. L. REV. 1031, 1048–50 (2005). At the time, the Governor wished to enter
into amended compacts with Indian tribes to expand casino gaming and obtain
badly needed revenue to balance the state’s budget. See Editorial, Doyle’s Risky
Casino Play, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 25, 2003, at 14A. A recent four-tothree decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (with Justice Sykes in the
majority) seemed to hold that the Governor’s ability to do so was severely
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Although Professor Lawrence Lessig has argued that an
“affinity” for the policies of, for example, the President who has
appointed a judge is “different” from financial support and “is
75
arguably part of the design of presidentially selected judges,” it
may be equally true that an “affinity” for the policies (or views) of
those who make up the coalitions and interests that elect a judge are
part of the “design” of electing judges. And just as disentangling the
potential for an improper quid pro quo in the federal context (i.e., a
judge who supports the position of the administration or party who
appointed him for no reason other than “pay back”) is difficult in the
appointment process, it may be equally difficult in the context of
76
campaign support.
What of speech by the candidate himself (e.g., a pledge to
support law enforcement or to protect families from dangerous
products or even to “end the practice of recognizing rights not
expressly set forth in the Constitution”)? Would such speech create
a “potential for bias” because that candidate may not want to rule in
a way that would be seen as inconsistent with prior statements?
Does it matter if the speech is made outside the campaign context?
Must there, in fact, be speech at all? Reviewing the Court’s
cases concerning judicial elections, Professor Pamela Karlan
concludes that they recognize that structural features of judicial
elections (including what candidates are permitted to say and who
limited or prohibited by a recent constitutional amendment banning casino
gaming. See Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 692–98 (Wis. 2004). Following
Justice Butler’s appointment, the court essentially reversed its decision in
Panzer, permitting the Governor to agree to any amount of casino gaming as
long as it was done by amending preexisting compacts. Dairyland Greyhound
Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408, 444 (Wis. 2006). Although I have been
critical of the Dairyland decision, see, e.g., RICK ESENBERG, A COURT UNBOUND?
THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 4 (2007),
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070329_WisconsinWhitePaper.pdf,
I
would
never suggest that Justice Butler failed to “hold the balance, nice, clear and
true.” Nevertheless, some may see something of a John Grisham plot here as
well and argue that Justice Butler owed a “debt of gratitude” to the Governor
that created a potential for bias in a case involving hundreds of millions of
dollars in state revenue. I raise the example to suggest that “appearances” can
arise in many ways.
75. Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept,
123 HARV. L. REV. 104, 110 (2009).
76. While Professor Lessig argues that there is no theory—or at least no
theory that we are likely to accept —“that makes money even arguably relevant
to the legal determinations of a court,” id., ruling in favor of the Governor’s or
President’s position in gratitude for one’s appointment is no more relevant.
Equally, money can be a proxy for support of a candidate’s judicial philosophy,
just as appointment of a like-minded jurist can reflect an expectation of, but not
a bargain for, desired results. As we will see later, the potential for a quid pro
quo may be more readily discerned in certain circumstances like those present
in Caperton, i.e., outsized contributions (or expenditures) by an individual party
in a very significant and imminent case. But the principle announced by
Justice Kennedy is not so limited.
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supports each candidate) can affect electoral outcomes, and that
77
electoral outcomes can affect adjudicatory results. There is ample
evidence that electoral concerns can affect the outcomes of certain
highly salient criminal cases without regard to anything said or any
78
money spent on a campaign If this is so, and if Caperton means
that it is a violation of due process to sit on a case in which the
adjudicatory outcome may impact or have been impacted in some
way by the electoral process and outcome, then “the logic of
Caperton is far more destabilizing than the Court might have
79
It may well “bring the Court onto a collision course
intended.”
80
Although Professor Karlan
with the practice of electing judges.”
has no doubt that courts will reject claims by criminal defendants
that electoral pressures deprive them of due process, it will be due to
81
Caperton, she concludes,
pragmatism rather than principle.
82
“cannot be so easily cabined.”
2.

Caperton on the Ground

There are some early indications that recusal motions will be
more prevalent than the Caperton majority assumed. In my home
state of Wisconsin, for example, there has been a series of motions—
some filed before Caperton—seeking the recusal of newly elected
77. Karlan, supra note 53, at 89.
78. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in
Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 793–94 (1995) (noting that while judges in
elective jurisdictions are far more likely to override jury sentences of life to
impose death sentences, in the one state with an appointed judiciary that
permits judicial overrides, judges more often override death sentences to impose
life sentences); Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A
Judge’s Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969,
1980 (1988) (noting the “substantial” risk that judges will “receive and act
upon” the message “that if they want to avoid negative votes, it is best to
produce results with which the voters will agree” and suggesting that that
message may have influenced the decisions of two members of the California
Supreme Court faced with retention votes); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C.
Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?,
48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004) (concluding on the basis of an empirical
analysis of sentencing practices in Pennsylvania that judges subject to retention
elections imposed sentences for several serious crimes that were “significantly
longer the closer the sentencing judge is to standing for reelection”); Nancy J.
King, How Different Is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital and Non-Capital
Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 204–06 (2004) (discussing the
effects of judicial elections on sentencing determinations).
79. Karlan, supra note 53, at 94. More than one commentator has argued
that judicial elections violate the due process rights of criminal defendants.
See, e.g., Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State
Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1101 (2006).
80. Karlan, supra note 53, at 92.
81. Id. at 93–94.
82. Id. at 93.
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83

Justice Michael Gableman.
These motions argue that certain
advertisements and other communications by the Gableman
campaign itself reflect—or create the potential for—an improper
84
bias against criminal defendants. A much-publicized e-mail from a
lawyer in the state public defenders office urged members of the
85
defense bar to make similar motions.
These motions have emphasized not merely the fact of
substantial independent expenditures, but the nature of the
message conveyed.
The advertisements attacked Gableman’s
opponent for being soft on crime and having been a public defender,
and praised candidate Gableman for his support of law enforcement
86
and former service as a prosecutor. They criticized the outcome in
certain cases in which Justice Butler had voted to uphold the claim
87
The motions were based not simply on
of a criminal defendant.
Justice Gableman’s speech, but also on the speech of the groups
88
None of those groups have any stake in the
supporting him.
criminal justice system other than that of any other group of
83. See State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863, 887, 888 & n.85 (Wis. 2010)
(describing a “cottage industry” of recusal motions that includes several motions
filed against Justice Gableman). Justice Gableman defeated incumbent Justice
Louis Butler. Michele Goodwin, Expressive Minimalism and Fuzzy Signals:
The Judiciary and the Role of Law, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 19, 22 n.13 (2009). By
way of full disclosure, although I did not endorse Justice Gableman or
contribute to or participate in his campaign, I commented frequently on issues
in the race and was one of a group of critics of what we perceived to be the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s move away from traditional practices of judicial
restraint. See, e.g., ESENBERG, supra note 74. Additionally, I recorded, without
compensation, a video for the WMC in which I commented, not on the election,
but on my views regarding the direction of the court. See WMCMedia,
Wisconsin Supreme Court Unbound: A Candid Conversation with Professor Rick
Esenberg, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=w06ghIy6_0Q. WMC ultimately used that video to raise funds for independent
expenditures in support of Justice Gableman. See, e.g., Issue Ads: The
Wisconsin Supreme Court 2008: What Is at Stake for Wisconsin?, WMC,
http://www.wmc.org/display.cfm?ID=1735 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). However,
I refused to permit a request for funds to be embedded in the video itself. As
noted below, I also criticized a Gableman campaign advertisement that is
featured prominently in the recusal motions—criticism that was, in fact, cited
to the court in support of at least one of the motions. See infra note 270.
84. For an example of a recusal motion, see Motion for Recusal of Justice
Gableman on Constitutional Grounds, State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Wis.
2010) (No. 2007AP795).
85. Lawyer: Justice Gableman Biased Against Defendants, FOX 21 NEWS,
Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.fox21online.com/news/lawyer-justice-gableman-biased
-against-defendants.
86. Wis. Judicial Comm’n v. Gableman (In re Judicial Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Gableman), 784 N.W.2d 631, 633 (Wis. 2010).
87. Id. at 634.
88. See, e.g., Motion for Recusal of Justice Gableman on Constitutional
Grounds, supra note 84, at 27–28; see also Penny J. White, “The Appeal” to the
Masses, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 251, 259 & n.70 (2008) (highlighting the speech
used by third parties in Justice Gableman’s election).
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concerned citizens. The parties (all criminal defendants) filing these
motions argue that Justice Gableman will feel a “debt of gratitude”
that can only be repaid by ruling against the claims of criminal
89
In other words, Justice Gableman will be biased by
defendants.
adhering to what appears to be, however crudely expressed, a
political or legal view of the proper balance between the demands of
public safety and the rights and interests of the accused. This is
indeed Caperton uncabined.
I share Professor Karlan’s skepticism that such motions are
likely to be successful. But, in Wisconsin, they have not been
denied. Although Justice Gableman denied the motion in one of the
cases, the full court deadlocked on whether it had the authority to
90
order recusal of a peer justice. Three justices held that the court
lacked such authority and three wanted more briefing and argument
91
on the question. Because the court deadlocked, the motion was not
92
granted.
Commenting on Caperton, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson (a
member of the group that wanted more briefing and argument on
the issue) suggested that it should not be treated as an “outlier” but
as an “important statement about the constitutional requirement of
93
She questioned whether “extreme facts” ought to
fair tribunals.”
94
be the appropriate standard. Justice David Prosser (a member of
the group that believed the court lacked authority to order recusal)
lamented that “[t]o date, the Caperton decision has had disastrous
95
consequences for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.”
As addressed more fully below, the Gableman motions, like
96
Caperton itself, may address an “extreme” case, but as judicial
89. See, e.g., Motion for Recusal of Justice Gableman on Constitutional
Grounds, supra note 84.
90. State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863, 863 (Wis. 2010). The Allen court also
made clear that it regarded the motions as facially deficient, arguing that
Caperton ought to be limited to allegations of a financial interest, bias for or
against a particular litigant, or bias against a constitutionally protected class.
See id. at 920–21 (Roggensack, J., concurring).
91. Compare id. at 889–90 (majority opinion) (showing three justices
requesting additional briefs), with id. at 873 (showing three justices who believe
the court lacks authority to determine recusal motions).
92. Id. at 863. Additionally, although motions in other cases remain
pending, it seems unlikely that any of them will be granted.
93. Id. at 880.
94. Id. at 886; accord id. (referring favorably to Justice Stevens’s view that
a campaign promise to be “tough on crime” should require recusal, and that
determining when ‘“tough on crime’ judicial electioneering” risks deprive a
criminal defendant of due process is “[n]ot an easy question but an important
one”).
95. Id. at 924 (Prosser, J., concurring).
96. A similarly “extreme” case occurred in Michigan when an attorney
representing the plaintiff in a wrongful-death action moved to recuse all of the
conservative members of the Michigan Supreme Court because of bias
stemming from criticism that the attorney had directed toward each of the

W04_ESENBERG

1302

11/11/2010 11:44:12 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

races become, in the words of one commentator, “nastier, noisier,
97
and costlier,” similar motions responding to either “tough on
crime” or “populist” campaigning would not be surprising. An early
draft of a report of the American Bar Association’s Judicial
Disqualification Project noted an increased willingness of judicial
candidates to take positions on disputed legal issues and stated that:
[O]ne might reasonably speculate that judicial candidates who
seek voter support by taking firm positions on issues they are
likely to decide as judges will be reluctant to disqualify
themselves when those issues arise, insofar as the voters who
supported them are, in effect, counting on their candidate to
98
make decisions they were elected to make.

II. RECUSAL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In the past several years, the Court has recognized a robust
99
It has found an
right of free speech for judicial candidates.
increasingly unfettered right for individuals and organizations to
engage in independent communications with respect to elections or
100
The Court has held that, at least
issues pertaining to elections.
under certain circumstances, the right to engage in electoral
advocacy may not be burdened by state action designed to counter or
101
It is notable that in
diminish the impact of that communication.
each of these cases, Justice Kennedy joined with the Caperton

judges and ten-year-old critical statements made by one the judges. Pellegrino
v. AMPCO Sys. Parking, 777 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 2010); see also Margaret Agius,
Michigan Supreme Court Denies Fieger Motion for Disqualification,
EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 30, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/x-14309-Detroit-Legal
-News-Examiner~y2010m1d30-Michigan-Supreme-Court-denies-Fieger-motion
-for-disqualification (discussing allegations of bias regarding three justices on
the Michigan Supreme Court made by the plaintiff’s attorney). The attorney
even argued, in support of his motion, that the voting pattern of the justices
reflected bias against his firm (i.e., they had not supported his clients’
positions). Agius, supra. Two of the justices denied the motions individually,
and a third motion, filed after the court changed its rules to require recusal
motions to be referred to the entire court, was denied by the remaining four
justices. Id.
97. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150
(1998).
98. Standing Comm. on Judicial Independence, Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of
the Judicial Disqualification Project 46 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished draft),
available
at
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs
/ABAJudicialdisqualificationprojectreport.pdf.
99. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002)
(holding that a canon of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial
election from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues
violates the First Amendment).
100. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010); FEC v.
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 482 (2007).
101. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2771–74 (2008).
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102

dissenters in five-to-four decisions.
It may be that Justice
Kennedy’s emphasis on the sui generis nature of Caperton is, in the
words of Hoersting and Smith, an attempt to “address a case that,
on its facts, seemed to shock the conscience—without damaging
Kennedy’s longstanding position in campaign finance cases that
judicial elections are much like other elections, and that
independent election expenditures enjoy the highest constitutional
103
If that is so, then the limits of Caperton are found not
protection.”
in its facts or in Justice Kennedy’s repeated expressions of disbelief
that such a thing could happen or is likely ever to happen again, but
in the Court’s own free speech doctrine. Caperton may not be
limited to a single train on a single day, but it ought not to be
applied expansively.
A.

Speech Rights for Judicial Candidates
1.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

The most important of the judicial-speech-rights cases is
104
because of how it
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
reconciles the state’s interest in reducing the potential for or
appearance of judicial bias with the free speech rights of judicial
candidates.
In recognizing a rather broad right of judicial
candidates to speak during an election free of the strictures of
105
ethical canons, the Court established certain principles regarding
the nature of judicial bias and the reconciliation of judicial elections
with judicial independence. These principles may help us to read
Caperton.
At issue in White was Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct’s
“announce clause,” which forbade judicial candidates from
106
announcing their position on disputed legal or political issues.
The Court found that the clause was an unconstitutional burden on
speech, impeding the ability of elected public officials to express
107
The restriction could
themselves on matters of public importance.
not, in the Court’s view, be justified by the state’s interest in

102. Compare Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256
(2009) (listing the members of the dissent as Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito), with Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (listing the members of the
majority as including Justice Kennedy and the Caperton dissenters), Davis, 128
S. Ct. at 2765 (same), Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S at 454 (same), and White,
536 U.S. at 766 (listing the members of the majority as including Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas).
103. Hoersting & Smith, supra note 52, at 320. Attorney Hoersting and
Professor Smith were struck by Justice Kennedy’s repeated references to what
were expenditures as contributions. Id. at 344–45.
104. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
105. Id. at 788.
106. Id. at 768.
107. Id. at 781–82, 788.
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assuring the fact or appearance of judicial impartiality.
In
assessing that interest, Justice Scalia, writing for a five-justice
majority, identified three senses in which a judge may be impartial.
His taxonomy is useful for the discussion that follows.
First, impartiality might require that a judge ought to be
impartial as between specific parties, i.e., each litigant should
expect that a judge will apply the law to him in the same way as she
109
This was the sense of impartiality
applies it to every other party.
claimed to be lacking in Caperton and the line of cases on which it
relied.
Second, impartiality may require that a judge lack any
110
Accordingly, a judge
preconception on a particular legal issue.
who, prior to any proceeding before her, believes that a state
constitutional mandate of equal protection requires legal recognition
of same-sex marriage is not impartial. For the White majority, that
interest cannot justify restrictions on speech. In fact, it is not a
legitimate interest at all. According to Justice Scalia, “A judge’s
lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case
has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice[;] it
is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have
111
In fact, that a judge’s mind would
preconceptions about the law.”
be a tabula rasa on significant legal issues, “would be evidence of
112
In Justice Scalia’s view, the
lack of qualification, not lack of bias.”
state’s interest in that form of impartiality can never constitute a
compelling interest.
Finally, impartiality may require open-mindedness, i.e., a
willingness “to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and
remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending
113
case,” not the lack of any preconception about an issue. “This sort
of impartiality,” according to Justice Scalia, “seeks to guarantee
each litigant, not an equal chance to win the legal points in the case,
114
The White Court assumed,
but at least some chance of doing so.”
but did not decide, that the state may have a compelling interest in
115
It concluded, however,
ensuring impartiality in this third sense.
that the “announce clause” was not narrowly tailored to ensure the
116
In the view of the
fact or appearance of impartiality in this sense.
majority, statements made by a judicial candidate outside of the
context of a judicial election or while holding judicial office are just
108. Id. at 777.
109. Id. at 775–76.
110. Id. at 777.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836 (1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 780.
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as likely to create (or not to create) a public perception of close117
Noting that “campaign promises are—by long
mindedness.
democratic tradition—the least binding form of human
commitment,”
Justice
Scalia
expressed
skepticism
that
nonpromissory statements could ever form the basis for concern
regarding a judge’s impartiality and that, in any event, “‘[d]ebate on
the qualifications of candidates’ is ‘at the core of our electoral
118
process and of the First Amendment freedoms,’ not at the edges.”
For the dissent, the unique nature of the judicial role makes the
particular views of a judicial candidate less important. Because
judges “do not sit as representatives of particular persons,
communities, or parties” and “serve no faction or constituency,” “‘[i]t
119
Because
is the business of judges to be indifferent to popularity.’”
of this, according to Justice Ginsburg, “the public’s ability to choose
agents who will act at its behest” is not only unnecessary in judicial
120
She
races, it is, in some sense, antithetical to the judicial role.
echoed the “legal” model of the judicial role:
Unlike their counterparts in the political branches, judges are
expected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies
or committing themselves on controversial issues in advance of
adversarial presentation.
Their mission is to decide
“individual cases and controversies” on individual records,
neutrally applying legal principles, and, when necessary,
“stand[ing] up to what is generally supreme in a democracy:
121
the popular will.”

Justice Ginsburg expressly rejected Justice Scalia’s taxonomy of
bias, arguing that considerations of judicial bias “do not focus solely
on bias against a particular party, but rather inquire more broadly
into whether the surrounding circumstances and incentives
compromise the judge’s ability faithfully to discharge her assigned
122
She offered a broad reading of the Court’s earlier cases on
duties.”
judicial bias that would later inform the opinions of both the
majority and dissent in Caperton:
These cases establish three propositions important to this
dispute. First, a litigant is deprived of due process where the
judge who hears his case has a “direct, personal, substantial,
and pecuniary” interest in ruling against him. Second, this
interest need not be as direct as it was in Tumey, where the

117. See id. at 778–81.
118. Id. at 780–81 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 222–23 (1989)).
119. Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380, 401 n.29 (1991)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 803–804 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 815 n.3.
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judge was essentially compensated for each conviction he
obtained; the interest may stem, as in Ward, from the judge’s
knowledge that his success and tenure in office depend on
certain outcomes. “[T]he test,” we have said, “is whether
the . . . situation is one ‘which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge [that] might lead
him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.’” And third,
due process does not require a showing that the judge is
actually biased as a result of his self-interest. Rather, our
cases have “always endeavored to prevent even the probability
of unfairness.” “[T]he requirement of due process of law in
judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of
the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it
123
on without danger of injustice.”

For Justice Ginsburg, “When [an elected] judicial candidate
promises to rule a certain way on an issue that may later reach the
courts, . . . she will be under pressure to resist the pleas of litigants
who advance positions contrary to her pledges on the campaign
124
This, she continued, would result in the judge having a
trail.”
“‘direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary interest’ in ruling
against certain litigants, for she may be voted off the bench and
thereby lose her salary and emoluments unless she honors the
125
A prohibition against the mere
pledge that secured her election.”
“announcement” of a judge’s political or legal views is necessary to
126
avoid circumvention on the restriction on pledges or promises.
2.

White and the Judicial Role

White certainly reflects a strong view of the constitutional free
speech imperative. The case has been criticized as an expression of
First Amendment “formalism” that fails to take into account the
127
Those Justices composing the
unique nature of the judicial role.
majority in White have generally been suspicious of government

123. Id. at 815 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 816.
125. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
126. See id. at 819–21.
127. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative
Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 317–19
(2003) (arguing that the White Court’s “attachment to existing constitutional
categories ‘election’ and ‘speech’” led to an “all or nothing” approach that
privileged the First Amendment above compelling state interests); Gregory P.
Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’s Free Speech
Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2208 & n.41 (2006) (contrasting
Justice Stevens’s “focus on the consequences of free speech decisions” with
“formal adherence to some libertarian abstraction” evident in decisions such as
White); Richard H. Pildes, Formalism and Functionalism in the Constitutional
Law of Politics, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1528–32 (2003) (asserting in discussion
of White and related cases that “the law of democracy remains one of the last
bastions of legal formalism in constitutional law”).
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128

attempts to manage political discourse.
But White also reflects a
particular view of the judicial role as well.
What is that view? White might be read as a repudiation of the
129
“traditionalist” or “formalist” models of judicial decision making.
On this view, judges do not rely on personal preferences or
philosophies but apply rules of law that can be, for the most part,
discerned and applied without relying on individual policy
130
In dissent, Justice Stevens echoed
preference and world views.
this model, writing that while judges may personally hold particular
131
To the
issue stances, they put these aside in deciding cases.
extent this is true, information about those views is irrelevant and a
candidate’s claim or implication that they may be considered in
132
It is not only unnecessary to the
deciding cases is “illegitimate.”
process of judicial selection but potentially harmful in that it may
lead the public to demand—and judges to provide—decisions that
133
owe more to what the public wants than what the law requires.
Other models for judicial behavior emphasize the degree to
which considerations other than “the facts and law” influence
128. Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas have generally voted to limit
restrictions of campaign expenditures and speech, often joined by former Chief
Justice Rehnquist. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 894 (2010);
see also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The
Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1757–59
(2001).
129. See, e.g., Anca Cornis-Pop, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and
the Announce Clause in Light of Theories of Judge and Voter Decisionmaking:
With Strategic Judges and Rational Voters, the Supreme Court Was Right To
Strike Down the Clause, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 124–25 (2004); Michael R.
Diminio, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the
First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 339–
42 (2003).
130. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 973, 981 (2001) (asserting that judges should decide based on “the
evidence and the law, not on public opinion polls, personal whim, prejudice or
fear, or interference from the legislative or the executive branches or private
citizens or groups”); Cornis-Pop, supra note 129, at 154 (“[T]he legal model
holds that judges routinely can and do set aside all personal and external biases
in exercising their discretion and deciding cases based on the facts and law
before them.”); Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About
Independent and Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 59 (2000) (asserting
that judges should have a “culture and cast of mind that approaches the
interpretive task as guided by principles that rise above personal or partisan
likes or dislikes”).
131. See White, 536 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Daniel Burke, Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B(1)(c): Toward the
Proper Regulation of Speech in Judicial Campaigns, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
181, 183 (1993).
133. See Pozen, supra note 62, at 273 (“[Under a formalist view of the
judicial process,] elections would not offer voters any meaningful choices, and
an appointive scheme would seem preferable as a way to economize on selection
costs and to ensure that candidates have the necessary technical
qualifications.”).
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judicial decision making. The classic attitudinal model, for example,
argues that judicial decision making is primarily—or at least
substantially—affected by a judge’s personal values and policy
134
If “judges are motivated by their personal policy
preferences.
preferences, the announce clause precludes discussion of issues that
135
are relevant to voters’ candidate choices.”
White certainly recognized the public’s interest in seeking—and
a candidate’s right to provide—information about a candidate’s
political or legal viewpoints and the ways in which those viewpoints
may impact adjudication. It accepts the idea that the voters may
hold judges accountable for adjudicatory outcomes.
If that
recognition was, in fact, rooted in a view that judges have wide
latitude to incorporate their personal views into decision making,
there would be a certain irony in play. The dissenters in White—
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer—have arguably seen
“legal” constraints on judicial decision making as less extensive and
the role of considerations of policy and “extralegal” values as more
136
Justice Scalia, of course, is
important to the process of judging.
more likely to see the judicial process as the lawyerly business of
discerning the meaning of a text and applying it in accordance with
that meaning and less likely to resort to considerations of policy and
137
other matters outside the text.
The argument over White’s consistency with the judicial role
mirrors a similar argument over judicial elections in general. David
Pozen recently argued that:
. . . elective judiciaries can be seen as the real-world
compatriots of the critical legal studies (CLS) and law and
economics movements, in that each sees judicial
decisionmaking in instrumental terms. As with the CLS-style
judge pursuing elite domination or the economic-minded judge
pursuing efficiency, the elected judge with an eye on the polls
is pursuing something other than the best legal answer. Or,
rather, her vision of the best legal answer may be conditioned
on something—public opinion—that cannot be found in any
138
accepted legal or moral source.

If White is seen as a case about the validation of an
134. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993).

J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT

AND

135. Cornis-Pop, supra note 129, at 126.
136. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 399 n.27 (1991) (Stevens, J.)
(“A judge brings to his or her job of interpreting texts ‘a well-considered
judgment of what is best for the community.’ As the concurrence notes, Justice
Holmes and Justice Cardozo each wrote eloquently about the ‘policymaking
nature of the judicial function.’” (citation omitted)).
137. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (describing Justice Scalia’s interpretive
philosophy).
138. Pozen, supra note 62, at 290.
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instrumental view of the judicial role, this would have rather jarring
implications. I would have sooner expected to see the “wolf . . . dwell
139
with the lamb” than Antonin Scalia sharing the jurisprudential
insights of Roberto Unger.
But, as most commentators recognize, real-world views of the
judicial role cannot be reduced to caricatures of judicial activism
(“judges do what they want”) and judicial restraint (“judges are
140
technicians”). Few believe that the judicial process is that simple.
White does recognize that judges differ in the way in which they
apply the law in ways that have nothing to do with experience and
qualifications, but that is a commonplace observation that cannot
explain the difference between the majority and the dissent and is of
limited value in discerning what the case might tell us about
resolving the tension between the impartiality that is claimed to be
rooted in judicial independence and the type of accountability sought
by the election of judges.
To the contrary, most lawyers and judges subscribe to some
141
That
form of the “strategic” model of judicial decision making.
model recognizes that while judges are influenced by their policy
preferences and may even wish to decide cases in accordance with
them, there are institutional values and external constraints that
restrain their ability to do so, such as legal texts, norms of opinion
writing, precedent, constraints imposed by other branches of
government, the institutional interests of the judiciary, and
142
internalization of notions of judicial restraint and public opinion.
Within this broad recognition of judicial limitations and license,
there are certain tensions. There is what has been referred to as the
“countermajoritarian difficulty,” the tension between judicial review
and the legitimacy conferred by the consent of the governed to a
particular law or public policy. In other words, “[T]he moral and
political problem posed by the power of courts to invalidate
legislation supported by democratic majorities (or at least legislative
143
To the extent that judges decide cases based on their own
ones).”
notions of what constitutes good or bad law or policy, their
interference with the political branches raises questions of
legitimacy.

139. Isaiah 11:6 (King James) (“The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and
the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the
fatling together; and a little child shall lead them.”).
140. See Cornis-Pop, supra note 129, at 154; Pozen, supra note 62, at 273–
74.
141. See Cornis-Pop, supra note 129, at 163–65 (describing the “strategic”
model of judicial decision making).
142. Id. at 163–64.
143. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2364 (2006); accord ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23
(2d ed. 1986) (discussing the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”).
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But there is also the “majoritarian difficulty,” i.e., recognition of
the ways in which the fear of, or a commitment to respect, public
144
No one believes
opinion might compromise judicial independence.
145
The
that judges should simply provide the public what it wants.
application of even clear and democratically adopted legal
standards—for example, to exclude an improperly obtained
confession or to dismiss the claims of an injured plaintiff—may be
unpopular. The public may be unable to appreciate the ways in
which the rule of law may lead to unpopular results. Public
pressures may cause judicial candidates to commit to certain
positions that interfere with disinterested discernment and
application of the law.
If, as David Pozen writes, “the countermajoritarian difficulty
asks ‘how unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a
regime committed to democracy,’ the majoritarian difficulty asks
‘how elected/accountable judges can be justified in a regime
146
White says something about the
committed to constitutionalism.’”
second question based on insights derived from the first. If judges
exercise discretion that is influenced by their personal values, policy
preferences, and preconceptions regarding legal questions, then
considerations of legitimacy require that these matters be known
and considered by those who select them. If judicial selection is
committed to voters, then the accountability to public opinion
cannot, without more, deprive a litigant of due process.
This tension is mirrored in calls for, on the one hand, judicial
independence and, on the other, judicial accountability—concepts
147
that are themselves in tension.
i. Deemphasis of the Majoritarian Difficulty: Accountability
Matters. It is almost obligatory in articles about judicial election
and recusal to recite former California Supreme Court Justice Otto

144. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995).
145. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 212
(2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that it is sometimes “difficult to
reconcile” elections with the desire for “a functioning judiciary respected for its
independence, its professional attainments and the absolute probity of its
judges”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (noting that judges must
sometimes defy the popular will); id. at 411 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining
that a judge’s duty to represent the law often requires her “to rule against the
People”).
146. Pozen, supra note 62, at 279.
147. See Judge Diane S. Sykes, Independence v. Accountability: Finding a
Balance Amidst the Changing Politics of State-Court Judicial Selection,
Address Before the Eastern District of Wisconsin Bar Association (Apr. 17,
2008), in 92 MARQ. L. REV. 341, 349 (2008) (“Elections operate as an external
constraint on state judges’ job performance. There is no question that this
weakens judicial independence—that’s the whole point. Independence and
accountability are important, but conflicting, values.”).
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Kaus’s evolving zoological similes regarding the impact of judicial
elections on controversial cases. At one time, he likened the matter
to “finding a crocodile in your bathtub when you go to shave in the
morning . . . . You know it’s there, and you try not to think about it,
148
but it’s hard to think about much else while you’re shaving.”
Later, perhaps seeking a less gendered approach, he said: “[w]hen
you’re eating dinner with a gorilla, it’s hard to make small talk, even
149
when he’s using the right knife and fork.”
An emphasis on the majoritarian difficulty may well lead to
150
calls, if not for the abolition of judicial elections, for a certain type
of election in which appeals to public opinion and discussion of
adjudicatory outcomes and legal or political issues are severely
151
Debate in these elections would tend to be platitudinous,
limited.
largely concerned with qualifications, experience, and the recitation
of uncontroversial (and uninformative) profundities. They would be,
as once observed, “about as exciting as a game of checkers. Played
152
They would be the sleepy old judicial elections that
by mail.”
some have come to love and would love to preserve.
More than one commentator has suggested that judicial silence
on controverted matters is necessary to bolster public confidence in
153
Even if the
the judiciary and acceptance of judicial decisions.
cognoscenti are aware that judging cannot be reduced to an entirely
dispassionate discernment of “the law,” it is best if the public
believes this to be so, i.e., there is a state interest in encouraging
what my old torts professor, Duncan Kennedy, referred to as “lay
formalism.” Others have expressed a lack of confidence in the
capacity of voters to assess the qualifications of judicial candidates.
For some, electing judges is the equivalent of electing nuclear
148. Maura Dolan, Court Is Feeling the Heat on Prop. 8: Justices Risk Recall
If They Vote To Overturn the State’s Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2008, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Philip Hager, Kaus Urges Reelection of Embattled Court Justices, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1986, at A3.
150. Justice Ginsburg and former Justice O’Connor have done just that. See
generally Robert Barnes, Ginsburg Would Forbid Judicial Elections, WASH.
POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A2; John Schwartz, Effort Begun To Abolish the Election
of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A12.
151. Pozen refers to accommodationists who seek to limit the salience of
judicial elections and the exchange of information, not because they support
judicial elections, but because they wish to limit them “as a second-best strategy
in a world in which judicial elections are not likely to go away anytime soon.”
Pozen, supra note 62, at 309. It is not that they think that limiting competition,
speech, participation, and turnout are good things, but they seek not to make
judicial elections “as good as possible,” but rather, “as inoffensive as possible.”
Id. It is a “fundamentally defensive creed.” Id. at 312.
152. William C. Bayne, Lynchard’s Candidacy, Ads Putting Spice into
Justice Race: Hernando Attorney Challenging Cobb, COMM. APPEAL (Memphis),
Oct. 29, 2000, at DS1.
153. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Burke, supra note 132, at 182–83.
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physicists.
As noted above, few lawyers—and no member of the Court—
would deny the need for judges to resist public pressure—at least
when the law requires a ruling that is unpopular. Support for an
appointive judiciary or nostalgia for the old, sleepy judicial election
is often justified by a desire to insulate judges from public pressure.
One might expect that those who believe that there is likely a clear
legal answer would value judicial independence more than those
who see the law as “underdetermined” and leaving relatively greater
room for the exercise of judicial discretion and judicial policy
making. Emphasis on judicial independence (in response to the
majoritarian difficulty) is often supported by a view of judicial
discretion that is cabined by the internal constraints of what Justice
155
Hamilton thought that the
Scalia calls “lawyer’s business.”
independence conferred on judges appointed for life would protect
“the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
156
He saw it as the “best expedient which can be
themselves.”
devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and
157
But he also saw a judiciary
impartial administration of the laws.”
“bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
158
them.”
But
perhaps
Hamilton’s
associationism
of
judicial
traditionalism with a high degree of institutional independence is
not quite right. It may well be that those who hold to the
“traditionalist” view of the judiciary or to a form of the strategic
model of voting that views the institutional and normative
constraints on judicial decision making as relatively strong are less
concerned with the need to shield judges from public opinion by

154. See Pozen, supra note 62, at 293 n.124 (“Most of what courts do is
opaque to people who are not lawyers. It is completely unrealistic to think that
the average voter will ever know enough about judicial performance to be able
to evaluate judicial candidates intelligently. That is a decisive objection
to . . . elect[ing] judges.” (quoting Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a
Political Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). But see Abrahamson, supra note 130, at 995 (“Underlying the debate
about appointed versus elected judges is a fundamental disagreement about the
capacity of the voters to choose wisely. If the people need more information, it
is our task to provide it.”).
155. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
157. Id. at 465.
158. Id. at 471; accord Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607–08 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a view of the Constitution as “evolving”
makes a “mockery” of Hamilton’s expectations).
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rendering judicial elections less salient and substantive.
If judges are significantly constrained by legal texts and
maxims of opinion writing, then the ability of the public to exert
159
If judges
“improper” influence on the judicial process is limited.
internalize—and the public demands—a more modest view of the
judicial role, the potential for intolerable compromise of judicial
independence is less likely. These constraints—as well as public
expectations—temper judicial populism and relieve the majoritarian
160
Of course, it could be argued that the campaign
difficulty.
discussion of issues and cases expands, rather than limits, the scope
of discretion. But there is certainly empirical evidence that calls
into question the notion that federal judges are the
161
countermajoritarian heroes that some may want them to be.
In contrast, the threat to judicial independence from judicial
elections and robust campaign speech may be more intractable to
those with a more expansive view of the judicial role. These jurists
may emphasize the countermajoritarian nature of the judiciary not
so much as a “difficulty,” but as a virtue. On this view, the exercise
of judicial discretion within that range of choices free from the type
of constraints recognized by the strategic model ought to be
exercised, insofar as is possible, free of public opinion. Judges are to
act as a restraint on democratic excess not only by holding a
democracy to the decisions it has made but also by protecting it from
improvident decisions or by making certain “essential” decisions
when the political processes have “failed” to so do so. Indeed, it may
well be that those jurists who believe that judges have more room
for the interpretation of “undetermined texts” and for the
importation of policy considerations into decision making are those
less favorably disposed to public influence on the process. In fact,
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in White emphasizes not so much the
freedom to discern and apply something like “a brooding
162
but the need for a judge to act—to
omnipresence in the sky,”
“discern” or “choose” whatever standard or methodology will inform
159. Professor Croley argued that the views of those who subscribe to a
rather narrow concept of judicial review, requiring a relatively clear
constitutional proscription before invalidating legislation, might be perfectly
consistent with elective judiciaries. See Croley, supra note 144, at 753–60.
Pozen argues, as noted in the text here, that this may not be so if majoritarian
sentiment causes judges to ignore clear legal commands. See Pozen, supra note
62, at 280 n.65.
160. See Sykes, supra note 147, at 349 (“[T]he internal constraints on judges
operate to prevent [accountability to the electorate] from becoming too great a
sacrifice. Most of the time, judges who do not stray too far too fast from the
judicial mainstream are reelected, often without opposition.”).
161. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1996) (acknowledging scholarly works that
question the countermajoritarian notion of the role of the judiciary); see, e.g.,
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993).
162. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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her decision making—independently of public opinion.
To
require—or even to permit—judges to offer their views for public
approbation is to undermine this stronger form of judicial
164
independence.
White puts paid to the latter view as a justification for the
restriction of speech. The Court rejects the idea that the state may
protect the countermajoritarian nature of the judicial function by
restricting discussion of legal and political issues that may affect
judicial decision making. In Justice Scalia’s view:
[The] complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise
of “representative government” might have some truth in
those countries where judges neither make law themselves nor
set aside the laws enacted by the legislature. It is not a true
picture of the American system. Not only do state-court judges
possess the power to “make” common law, but they have the
165
immense power to shape the States’ constitutions as well.

This, he continues, is why judicial elections became popular and
the state may not, in the interest of protecting judges from public
opinion, “prohibit candidates from communicating relevant
166
information to voters during an election.”
In states that have opted for judicial elections, there can be no
effort on the part of the state to restrict the flow of information on
the grounds that it will render candidates more “responsive” to the
public or because voters will misapprehend candidate messages and
choose poorly. Thus, Justice Kennedy, concurring in White, writes
that:
Minnesota may choose to have an elected judiciary. It may
strive to define those characteristics that exemplify judicial
excellence. It may enshrine its definitions in a code of judicial
conduct. It may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than
due process requires, and censure judges who violate these
standards. What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor
what the people hear as they undertake to decide for
themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary
judicial officer. Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is
167
the right of the voters, not the State.

White recognizes that if judicial elections are to be permitted,
163. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 806 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that judges must “be indifferent to
popularity” and “do what is legally right” even if it is not what “the home crowd”
wants, and that the outcome of cases “cannot depend on the will of the public”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. Pozen, supra note 62, at 327.
165. White, 536 U.S. at 784 (majority opinion).
166. Id. at 782.
167. Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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then judicial independence cannot mean that judges be freed from
being held accountable by an electorate that may disapprove of
certain adjudicatory outcomes. The restriction of campaign speech
is only one way in which popular opinion might affect judicial
168
In fact, the White Court
decision making in an elective system.
observed that “campaign promises are—by long democratic
169
A
tradition—the least binding form of human commitment.”
number of studies show that judicial candidates may conform their
decisions to the perceived preferences of the electorate (or other
170
retention agents) or its preference for “tough-on-crime” judging.
This is unrelated to whether a judge has said a word on the subject,
and in fact, at least one study finds that judges align their decision
making most closely when an election is imminent, irrespective of
171
It seems unlikely, then, that
personal policy preferences.
prohibiting a candidate from stating his position could ever resolve
the majoritarian difficulty in the sense of eliminating or even
172
reducing popular pressure.
Thus, the White majority flatly rejected Justice Ginsburg’s view
that a judge who fears a decision might cause him to lose support is
the equivalent of a “direct, personal, substantial[, and] pecuniary
173
interest” in ruling against certain litigants:
[I]f, as Justice Ginsburg claims, it violates due process for a
judge to sit in a case in which ruling one way rather than
another increases his prospects for reelection, then—quite
simply—the practice of electing judges is itself a violation of
due process. . . . [These views] are not, however, the views
reflected in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which has coexisted with the election of judges

168. See id. at 782 (majority opinion) (“Surely the judge who frees Timothy
McVeigh places his job much more at risk than the judge who (horror of
horrors!) reconsiders his previously announced view on a disputed legal issue.”).
169. Id. at 780. Professor Michelle Friedland observes that at least one
contract law casebook and two leading contract law treatises use a case
involving a broken campaign promise as an example of the “intention not to be
bound” doctrine. Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due
Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563,
602 (2004).
170. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
171. See Friedland, supra note 169, at 621–24.
172. Erwin Chemerinsky argues that a “judge who is trying, consciously or
unconsciously, to please the voters will take the politically popular approach,
whether or not it was expressed previously.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions
on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735,
744 (2002). If the position becomes unpopular, he is likely to abandon it. Id. at
744–45. “Either way,” Chemerinsky concludes, “the earlier speech itself makes
little difference in the judge’s behavior.” Id. at 745.
173. White, 536 U.S. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

W04_ESENBERG

1316

11/11/2010 11:44:12 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

ever since it was adopted . . . .

[Vol. 45

174

In fact, those who believe that judicial discretion is more
constrained may well see the emphasis on judicial independence—
advocated by those with a more expansive view of the judicial role—
as an attempt to mask judicial policy making behind a façade of
formalism. This suggests another lesson to be derived from White.
ii. Emphasis of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: Differing
Perspectives Matter. Although the countermajoritarian difficulty is
typically associated with appointed judiciaries, it might also be
relevant to elections if voters are denied what may be the most
relevant information about competing candidates. White says that
this information is relevant and, in doing so, reflects changes in the
federal confirmation process. Lawyers have always understood that
while, for example, Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg are
both brilliant lawyers, they differ dramatically in their approach to
175
Acknowledging and evaluating those differences is an
the law.
important part of the selection process. Just as the federal
confirmation process has become more concerned with a nominee’s
176
substantive views, voters have a right to know something about a
candidate’s legal philosophy and policy preferences. If the legal
preconceptions and policy preferences of judges are important to
decision making, then they are equally as important to the judicialselection process. If a state has chosen to elect its judges, then
accountability and popular sovereignty require that voters have the
ability to assess all pertinent information about a candidate without
state interference.
Indeed, some commentators argue that judicial elections relieve
177
Elections, it is argued, impart
the countermajoritarian difficulty.

174. Id. at 782–83 (majority opinion).
175. See Phil Brennan, Justice Scalia: Ruth Ginsburg Is My Best Friend,
NEWSMAX.COM (May 16, 2008), http://www.newsmax.com/InsideCover/scalia
-ginsberg/2008/05/16/id/323695 (noting Justice Scalia statement that Justice
Ginsberg’s “basic approach is not mine”).
176. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Kagan’s View of the Court Confirmation Process,
Before She Was a Part of It, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A16 (recounting
Justice Kagan’s view that “many of the votes a Supreme Court justice casts
have little to do with technical legal ability and much to do with conceptions of
value” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Awkward: Kagan’s Confirmation
Hearings Criticism, CBSNEWS.COM (June 3, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com
/stories/2010/06/03/politics/main6544287.shtml (noting that then-U.S. Supreme
Court nominee Elena Kagan may be questioned more substantively during her
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing).
177. Pozen, supra note 62, at 324–25 (citing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 168 n.17 (1982); Judith Resnik,
Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1629 (2006); and Jonathan Zasloff,
Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California’s Separation of Powers, 51
UCLA L. REV. 1079, 1083 n.10 (2004)).
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democratic legitimacy on the judicial branch and provide for greater
178
If that is so—and it is certainly an objective
public accountability.
of states that have decided to elect judges—then making those
elections meaningful by allowing the public to demand and
candidates to provide information that may be pertinent to the
adjudication of cases may further that purpose. Some have even
argued that judicial elections free state courts to intervene in the
179
political process in “progressive” ways, while others suggest that
elected judges are less likely to offend the majority’s wishes and that
it may be better “for progressives to turn their back on elective
180
judiciaries, in aspiration if not in advocacy.”
However that may be, White rejects the idea that the state can
pick and choose what information voters can be trusted with or
superintend the way in which it is presented. The decision makes
clear that these interests do not justify prohibiting the discussion of
legal and political issues—even those issues that may later come
181
It reflects a rather strong
before the candidate once elected.
skepticism that the state may dictate “how” these issues are to be
discussed. If the voters cannot be trusted to evaluate judicial
178. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The
Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1157–61 (1999).
179. See Pozen, supra note 62, at 325–26 (recounting scholarly work that
argues that an elected judiciary has the people’s endorsement to take
progressive interpretive views).
180. Id. at 327. This is not clear. Whether “progressive” policies favor, as
Pozen puts it, “traditionally disadvantaged or despised groups,” see id., they are
likely to be advanced by elective judiciaries’ economic populism and may well be
served by elective judiciaries. While “tough-on-crime” ads are one form of
appeal to majority sentiment, ads attacking a judge’s supposed affinity for
insurance companies or manufacturers are another. In fact, some studies show
that state courts are just as likely to uphold claims of federal rights. See, e.g.,
Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State
and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233 (1999); Michael E. Solomine &
James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An
Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983).
Others have noted that claims related to gay rights have also done well in state
courts. See generally, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16
CONST. COMMENT. 599 (1999). Although a majority of the state supreme courts
that have found a state constitutional right to same-sex marriage or civil unions
are appointive, some are elective. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008) (appointive); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)
(elective). A recent study by Professors Joshua Hall and Russell Sobel
concludes that judiciaries in states with merit election systems tend to perform
better on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s ranking of state legal systems. See
generally JOSHUA C. HALL & RUSSELL S. SOBEL, SHOW-ME INST., IS THE ‘MISSOURI
PLAN’ GOOD FOR MISSOURI? THE ECONOMICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION (2008),
available at http://www.showmeinstitute.org/docLib/20080515_smi_study_15
.pdf.
181. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 172, at 745 (“I cannot imagine a credible
argument that it violates due process for Justice Scalia to sit on abortion cases,
though it is absolutely clear as to how he will vote.”).

W04_ESENBERG

1318

11/11/2010 11:44:12 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

candidates, then judges ought not be elected. Judicial candidates
have opinions on these matters. The opinions matter. Voters are
entitled to ask and candidates have a right to tell.
iii. Judicial Elections Are Different: Independence Still Matters.
The White majority, nevertheless, recognized that there is a certain
tension between the election of judges and judicial independence.
The Court acknowledged that a state has a compelling interest in
182
It also
preventing favoritism for or against particular parties.
assumed that a state might have a compelling interest in ensuring
183
at least a certain type of judicial open-mindedness.
That interest cannot be preserved by requiring judges to
pretend (in public) that they approach each matter with a mind
wiped clean—a tabula rasa free of any preconceptions.
Nevertheless, unlike legislators and executives, there is a sense in
which we believe that a judge ought to be open to argument and
willing to change her mind.
Categorical commitments by a
candidate for governor (“I will never raise taxes”) are acceptable, but
the same type of promise by a candidate for judgeship (“Read my
lips! No more affirmative action!”) might be different.
Additionally, there may be a sense in which judges are bound to
impartiality toward classes of litigants in a way that legislators and
executives are not. We may not believe it admirable that a
legislator might promise to “fleece the rich” or to “go after big out-ofstate companies.”
But these statements do not, in and of
themselves, raise constitutional concerns. We would not think that
they prohibit the legislator from acting on proposals for progressive
taxation or more legislation expanding the liability of
manufacturers.
Finally, although there is a band of judicial discretion and the
law is often undetermined, there are times when it is quite clear.
White’s recognition of the right of a judge to state views that are
relevant in determining how she will exercise her discretion may not
apply—or at least not in the same way—to a judicial candidate’s
stated intent not to follow the law (“I will never follow Roe v. Wade”).
3.

The Application of White

Post-White decisions in the lower courts seem generally
consistent with these observations.
They suggest a robust
protection against rules that seek to silence a candidate’s statement
of his legal views, whether a blanket prohibition against announcing
those views or an application of rules prohibiting pledges, promises,
or commitments in a way that effectively prevents a candidate from
184
However, even
addressing issues of likely interest to the voters.
182. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–77 (2002).
183. Id. at 778–81.
184. See, e.g., Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
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after White, it may be permissible to prohibit candidates from
promising to decide a particular case in a particular way (something
that would presumably foreclose his willingness to be persuaded to
change those views or would mean that he has committed to some
predetermined view of the facts as opposed to the law). Consistent
with Justice Scalia’s recognition of a compelling interest in
preventing bias in White’s first sense, it may also be permissible to
adopt rules or practices that protect against bias toward particular
litigants or classes of litigants.
Some courts have extended White’s invalidation of “announce
clauses” to a variety of canons designed to prevent candidates from
“committing or appearing to commit”—or even from “pledging or
185
Others have
promising” to adhere to—a particular position.
upheld facial challenges to these clauses, but only after narrowing
constructions that make clear that these restrictions do not apply to
186
In Duwe v.
a mere statement of a legal or political position.
187
Alexander, for example, a district court rejected a facial challenge
to Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3)(b), which provided that a
judge or judicial candidate shall not make, “with respect to cases,
controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court,
pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the
188
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office.”
The court noted that the rule “require[d] an actual commitment to
rule a certain way on a case, controversy or issue likely to come
189
The court concluded that the state does have a
before the court.”
compelling interest in assuring impartiality in the third sense
190
While that interest
addressed by White, i.e., open-mindedness.
might not be served by restrictions aimed at the prior expression of
a view on a pertinent legal issue, it may be served by a promise to
adhere to that position—even one limited to statements made in the
191
context of an election.
But the court upheld an “as applied” challenge, concluding that
the rule could not be applied to prohibit responses to a questionnaire
that asked, not for commitments, but for a statement of position on
192
According to the district judge, “There is a very real
legal issues.
distinction between a judge committing to an outcome before the
case begins, which renders the proceeding an exercise in futility for
(holding that a rule that governed speech and conduct of judges violated the
First Amendment).
185. See, e.g., N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021,
1024, 1037–42 (D.N.D. 2005).
186. See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 196 P.3d 1162 (Kan. 2008).
187. 490 F. Supp. 2d 968.
188. Id. at 975–77.
189. Id. at 975.
190. See id. at 975–76.
191. See id. at 976.
192. See id. at 976–77.
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all involved, and a judge disclosing an opinion and predisposition
193
Setting forth one’s views without commitment “is
before the case.”
nothing more than acknowledgment of the inescapable truth that
thoughtful judicial minds are likely to have considered many issues
and formed opinions on them prior to addressing the issue in the
194
context of a case.”
Although Duwe rejected a facial challenge to the state’s “pledges
or promises” clause, it upheld a facial challenge to Wisconsin
Supreme Court Rule 60.04(4)(f), which required a judge to recuse
herself when she has made a public statement that “commits, or
appears to commit, the judge with respect to . . . an issue in the
195
The use of the
proceeding [or a] controversy in the proceeding.”
term “appears to commit” extended, or threatened to extend,
application of the rule to the mere announcement of a position on a
196
legal or political issue protected by White.
Other courts have also struck down canons that prohibit
statements that “commit or appear to commit” a candidate with
respect to an issue or controversy. In North Dakota Family Alliance,
197
Inc. v. Bader, for example, a district court held that “[t]here is no
real distinction between announcing one’s views on legal or political
issues and making statements that commit, or ‘appear to commit,’ a
judicial candidate with respect to cases, controversies, and issues
198
Bader also upheld a
that are likely to come before the court.”
facial challenge to a canon prohibiting “pledges or promises” as
199
However, although the court concluded that North Dakota
well.
had a compelling interest in ensuring impartiality toward parties,
200
Similarly, in
these clauses were too broad to serve that goal.
201
the
Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolnitzek,
district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement
202
However,
of Kentucky’s “commits or appears to commit” clauses.
in the district judge’s view, the state could prohibit a judicial
candidate from promising to rule in a certain way on an issue likely
to face the court, but Kentucky’s restriction was not so limited and
203
Two other courts have reached
could not survive strict scrutiny.
similar conclusions, although the decision below in each was

193. Id. at 975.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 977.
196. Id.
197. 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D. 2005).
198. Id. at 1041.
199. Id. at 1038–42.
200. Id. at 1044.
201. 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004).
202. Id. at 711–12.
203. Id. at 704. The Sixth Circuit declined to stay the injunction. Family
Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 388 F.3d 224 (6th
Cir. 2004).
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ultimately dismissed on appeal for lack of ripeness or for
204
mootness.
Like Duwe, at least one state court has upheld “pledges or
promises” clauses through a narrowing construction. In Kansas
205
Judicial Review v. Stout, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the
state’s prohibition of a “pledges or promises” clause construing it in
a way that did not prohibit a candidate from announcing his or her
206
It adopted a similar
personal views on disputed questions.
construction of the “commit or appears to commit” clause stating
that it prohibited only statements that bind a candidate to a
207
However, shortly after White, the Florida
particular disposition.
208
209
Supreme Court, and the New York Court of Appeals applied
such clauses without any readily apparent limiting construction.
These cases will be discussed below.
B.

Speech Rights of Interested Parties

White is instructive, but there is more. The First Amendment
protects not only the rights of candidates to speak, but also the right
of third parties to be heard on issues that may be pertinent to a
campaign during the election cycle.
In Federal Elections
210
for example, the
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,
Court recognized a First Amendment right for corporations to
211
The Court
engage in issue advocacy during an election.
recognized a broad right for persons to comment on matters of public
interest—even during an election season and even when the
communication mentions a candidate for office and has not been
212
In
funded in accordance with campaign finance restrictions.
213
the Court
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
extended that right to independent advocacy for or against the
214
election of a particular candidate.
Both Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life have
recognized that independent expenditures do not present the same
potential for corruption as do campaign contributions. Writing for
204. See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Kan.
2006) (enjoining pledges or promises, commits, and solicitation clauses), appeal
dismissed, 562 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2009); Alaska Right to Life Political Action
Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Alaska 2005) (striking “pledge or
promise” and “commit or appears to commit” clauses as unconstitutional),
vacated, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007).
205. 196 P.3d 1162 (Kan. 2008).
206. Id. at 1172–74.
207. Id. at 1174–75.
208. See In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 85–89 (Fla. 2003).
209. See In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 5–8 (N.Y. 2003).
210. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
211. See id. at 469–82.
212. See generally Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449.
213. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
214. Id.
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the majority in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy described the
rationale behind the distinction:
The Buckley Court explained that the potential for quid pro
quo corruption distinguished direct contributions to candidates
from independent expenditures. The Court emphasized that
“the independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails to serve any
substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or
appearance of corruption in the electoral process,” because
“[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination . . .
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
215
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”

Caperton, of course, found a due process duty of recusal based on
216
Nevertheless, Citizens United
independent expenditures.
suggests the contradiction may be less stark than it may have
appeared immediately after Caperton. Given Justice Kennedy’s
distinction between contributions and expenditures and his robust
reaffirmation of the distinction in Citizens United, it seems unlikely
that the Court’s longstanding distinction between contributions and
independent expenditures is not pertinent in judicial elections and is
not relevant in assessing the scope of Caperton. Although—as we
have seen—there are problems with this narrative about Caperton,
Justice Kennedy appears to have seen Blankenship’s expenditures
217
as both unusual and tantamount to contributions.
The recognition of a broad right of independent groups and
individuals to speak has two implications. First, it suggests that the
ability to police judicial independence through the restriction of
candidate speech is limited. If public criticism of judicial decisions
exacerbates the majoritarian difficulty, regulation of candidate
speech—either directly or through recusal—becomes dramatically
underinclusive.
While one could argue that the independent
statements of a candidate’s supporters can lead or contribute to a
duty to recuse (the Gableman recusal motions, discussed above,
make precisely that claim), this seems rather attenuated.
Candidates have, by definition, no control over what independent
218
supporters may say.
215. Id. at 901–02 (alternation in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1976)).
216. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259–67 (2009).
217. Kennedy repeatedly referred to Blankenship’s contributions:
“Blankenship contributed some $3 million”; “[w]hether Blankenship’s campaign
contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of Benjamin’s victory is not
the proper inquiry”; “[t]he temporal relationship between the campaign
contributions, the justice’s election, and the pendency of the case is also
critical”; “absent recusal, Justice Benjamin would review a judgment that cost
his biggest donor’s company $50 million”; “Blankenship’s extraordinary
contributions.” Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264–65.
218. One might argue that independent messages can support a duty to
recuse only if the candidate does not disavow them. It is unlikely, however,
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Second, Caperton notwithstanding, the Court’s longstanding
distinction of expenditures and contributions says something about
the likelihood that expenditures will have an impact on a public
official that might support the restriction of speech. Whatever “debt
of gratitude” or appearance of improper influence that they create
has generally been insufficient to overcome First Amendment
protections.
C.

Does Recusal Restrict Speech?

It has been suggested that a constitutionally or statutorily
mandated duty of recusal may be considerably broader than
permissible restrictions on speech, i.e., it may be triggered by a
relatively large amount of speech that is constitutionally
219
The speech engaged in and funded by Blankenship,
protected.
after all, was certainly constitutionally protected. Justice Kennedy
joined the majority in Citizens United, Caperton, Wisconsin Right to
220
Perhaps, robust protection for campaign
Life, Inc., and White.
speech by judicial candidates and their supporters—at least in his
mind—does not mean that this constitutionally protected speech
cannot result in a mandatory duty of recusal. Indeed, concurring in
White, Justice Kennedy wrote that states may “adopt recusal
standards more rigorous than due process requires, and censure
judges who violate these standards,” although they may not “censor
what the people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves
221
which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer.”
222
In Citizens
He repeated that observation in Caperton itself.
United, he wrote, without explanation, that Caperton was “limited
to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s
223
political speech could be banned.”
Clearly, due process may require recusal as a result of speech
that is protected. There is, to be sure, a “play in the joints” between
the right to speak and the duty to recuse in which the former is not
always immunized from the latter. Nevertheless, the extent and
nature of the right to speak ought to tell us something about the
extent and nature of the duty to recuse. To recognize a large “play
in the joints” would be overly dismissive of the interests recognized
by White and the campaign finance cases. Just as with the
that disavowal will have much impact on the public’s reaction to independently
sponsored messages and that, therefore, disavowal will reduce whatever
pressure the public places on a judge. Nor is it clear that disavowal will
dissuade independent supporters from spending money.
219. See infra notes 227–29 and accompanying text.
220. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Caperton, 129 S. Ct.
2252; FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
221. White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
223. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
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continuing viability of the distinction between expenditures and
contributions, Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the extraordinary
nature of the Caperton facts may prove to be important. As noted
above, Kennedy’s Caperton opinion tended to elide the distinction
between contributions and expenditures—a distinction that Justice
Kennedy strongly reaffirmed in Citizens United. He joined the
White majority, and it seems unlikely that he believes that
aggressive recusal requirements do not restrict speech.
224
the Court, with
In Davis v. Federal Election Commission,
Justice Kennedy in the majority, struck down a federal statute that
increased campaign contribution limits and lifted the cap on
coordinated party expenditures for candidates who face a selffinancing opponent whose spending has exceeded a specified
225
This so-called millionaire’s amendment was held to
amount.
burden the exercise of the self-financing candidate’s right to
226
The burden was, of course, a
advocate for her own election.
benefit to the opponent, rendering her own speech less effective. If
the price of candidate or third-party speech on an issue is
disqualification of a judge from ever addressing that issue, then it
would seem that the right to speak has been effectively undermined.
Davis cautions against burdening the free speech rights of
candidates, even in indirect ways.
Duwe is also instructive. In passing on the constitutionality of
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.04(4)(f), the court held that the
fact that these provisions did not purport to prohibit restricted
speech but only to require recusal did not render White inapplicable:
While it is true that the recusal requirement is not a direct
regulation of speech, the chilling effect on judicial candidates
is likely to be the same. Although a candidate would not fear
immediate repercussions from the speech, the candidate would
be equally dissuaded from speaking by the knowledge that
recusal would be mandated in any case raising an issue on
227
which he or she announced a position.

A broad reading of Caperton would permit a candidate or his
supporters to exercise their right to speak on political and legal
issues only at the expense of the candidate being unable to address
those issues if elected. The impact is likely to be the suppression of
speech. It is, in fact, the objective of such a reading. Requiring
recusal when a candidate has announced his or her views would be,
228
It
in the view of Professor Roy Schotland, “an inspired step.”
224. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
225. Id. at 2770–72.
226. Id. at 2766, 2772.
227. Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 977 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
228. Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan
Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1419–20 (2003); accord Joseph
E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining Respectability in the
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would provide candidates cover to say that “I know what you’d like
me to say, but if I go into that then I’ll be unable to sit in just the
229
cases you care about most.”
The impact of a broad recusal right, then, would tend to inhibit
or limit interested parties’ participation in judicial elections. While
some might suggest that a limitation is just what is needed, driving
out the participation of groups and individuals affected by the courts
is unlikely to lead to Athenian democracy but to a process
dominated by incumbents, media, and the bar. This is impossible to
reconcile with White except in the most formalist and didactic of
ways—you can speak, but, if you do, your speech and what it
conveys to voters will become irrelevant. This is, in White’s sense, to
deny voters the information that they need to make an intelligent
choice between candidates.
Broad recusal rights are likely, moreover, to lead to what the
Caperton minority feared and Justice Kennedy said would not (and,
at least implicitly, should not) happen: strategic attempts to remove
230
Although
judges thought to be unfavorable to a litigant’s position.
this may be manageable at the level of a trial court, it is problematic
for multimember appellate courts in which voters have presumably
elected each judge to sit, insofar as is possible, on all cases. Recusal,
particularly in courts of last resort, frustrates the public will and
impedes the development of the law. Even when state law provides
for the appointment of a replacement, the public’s choice of judges—
often on issues of great public importance—is frustrated.
Although the same cases that struck down clauses prohibiting
“pledges or promises” or statements that “commit or appear to
commit” candidates to a particular position have upheld canons
requiring recusal when, among other things, a “judge’s impartiality
could reasonably be questioned,” they do not describe what
circumstances require recusal or when recusal can be required as a
result of protected speech. If, as seems to be the case, speech that
cannot be restricted may lead to recusal, it is necessary to attend to
the framework of White and the campaign finance cases.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT FOR CAPERTON
As noted above, the Caperton majority and the dissent differed
on the importance of announcing a well-defined standard that would
guide application of what is likely to be seen as a broader due

Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2005) (warning of the dangers of mandatory
recusal); Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and
Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L.
REV. 691, 709 (2007) (“Finally, the existence of a recusal process will give
judicial candidates ‘cover’ to avoid making promises or commitments during
campaigns in particular or during the course of the judicial service.”).
229. Schotland, supra note 228, at 1420.
230. See Rotunda, supra note 60, at 265.
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process right to (and duty of) recusal. Chief Justice Roberts
231
while
predicted mischief as lawyers play the Caperton card,
Justice Kennedy thought it sufficient unto the day to say that,
whatever the Due Process Clause might require in another case, it
called for the recusal of Justice Benjamin in the matter before the
232
Court.
As Professor Karlan observes, this division reflects a longrunning debate over the manner in which courts should monitor the
political process:
Caperton ties into a longstanding methodological debate over
judicial intervention in the political process. On the one hand,
theories of representation reinforcement, most notably John
Hart Ely’s, have identified an antientrenchment rationale for
judicial review: a court actually promotes democracy when it
overturns decisions made by political insiders stacking the
deck and “choking off the channels of political change to
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out.” On
the other hand, fear of embroiling the judiciary in the “political
thicket” creates strong pressure for the Supreme Court to
intervene only when it can identify and articulate an objective
233
test for adjudicating politics-related claims.

For example, Professor Lessig, otherwise sympathetic to
Caperton and concerned about the impact of campaign contributions
and expenditures on judicial impartiality, also expresses concern
234
Lessig questions
about the decision’s fidelity to the judicial role.
whether the decision will weaken the institution of the judiciary by
“unnecessarily forcing it” to make “judgments that cannot help but
appear political, or because the rule it seeks to implement is
235
These risks, he says, were
predictably unadministratable[.]”
236
“dramatically remarked” by Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent.
As noted earlier, some argue that Caperton motions will be
237
rare, but, as Professor Karlan observes, the impact of Caperton is
not limited to—and may not even be principally a result of—
238
Recusal motions will be directed, at
adjudicated recusal motions.
least in the first instance, to the judge whose impartiality is
questioned and the federal review will be confined to the Supreme
Court, limiting the opportunity for clarification of just what due

231. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267–75 (2009)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 2262–65 (majority opinion).
233. Karlan, supra note 53, at 95 (footnotes omitted).
234. See Lessig, supra note 75, at 113.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 114.
237. See, e.g., Green, supra note 56, at 233.
238. Karlan, supra note 53, at 100–01.
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239

process requires.
This, in my view, underscores, rather than
diminishes, the need for clear direction. If the Caperton rule is
likely to be a machine that runs off itself, then greater clarity as to
its proper use is in order.
In a forthcoming paper, Professors Andrey Spektor and Michael
Zuckerman argue that the tension between a strong due process
imperative for recusal and the speech rights of judicial candidates
and their supporters calls for a limit on Caperton and suggest using
240
Although
the balancing test announced in Matthews v. Eldridge.
Matthews certainly describes, in a fashion, what one must do to
resolve this tension, standing alone, it, like most “balancing tests,” is
characterized by an inclusivity that is both a virtue and vice. A
direction to consider all pertinent factors can be almost no direction
241
It is my belief that the Court’s First Amendment
at all.
jurisprudence can tell us something about how the scales will tip.
A.

Candidate Speech
1.

Statement of Position on Legal or Political Issues

One thing seems easy. The expression of a position on a legal
issue—at least as long as it does not rise to the level of a “promise”
or “pledge”—is not only constitutionally protected, but does not,
given White, give rise to the type of bias that the state has an
interest in preventing. Having a view on a legal or political issue is
242
The
not the type of bias with which the state may concern itself.
fact that a judge might feel pressure to rule in a way that is
consistent with his earlier stated position or with public opinion
does not give rise to due process concerns of sufficient gravity to
243
justify the restriction of speech.
But perhaps it’s not so easy. Some have argued—and some

239. Id. at 100.
240. Andrey Spektor & Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal & Expanding
Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at
31–42),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1564385. The Matthews test requires a balancing of:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
241. Cf. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (proclaiming that the balancing test set forth by
the Court in the case “is more like judging whether a particular line is longer
than a particular rock is heavy”).
242. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777–78 (2002).
243. See id. at 782–83.

W04_ESENBERG

1328

11/11/2010 11:44:12 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

post-White decisions have held—that a judge ought not “promise” to
244
The Kansas Supreme Court
rule in a particular way.
distinguishes between a question that asks “[w]hat is your stance on
245
The
abortion?” and “[d]o you vow to overturn Roe v. Wade?”
former would likely be “a permissible pronouncement of a personal
view on a disputed legal issue,” while the latter would
246
“impermissibly bind a candidate to a particular legal action.”
While this is fair enough, it masks a variety of intermediate
approaches. What of a candidate who criticizes Roe or who
announces that, in her view, the Constitution does not protect a
right of privacy or that such a right ought not to extend to abortion?
White would seem to compel the conclusion that this does not
constitute impermissible bias.
One might distinguish between statements of law—e.g., a claim
that sexual orientation ought to be considered a suspect
classification—and legal conclusions that presumably require
attention to findings of fact that a candidate could not have made—
e.g., an expression of the view that a state’s method of financing
schools unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of race (when
such a conclusion requires factual inquiries as to intent or impact)
or a commitment to “always” sentence sexual offenders to the
maximum term of confinement when state law requires
consideration of mitigating factors. Thus, while a candidate may, as
one commentator has suggested, promise to give harsher, or perhaps
247
even higher, sentences for drunk drivers, she may not do so in a
way that suggests she will not consider all that sentencing law
requires.
And perhaps candidates must avoid the language of promise or
248
For Justice Ginsburg, this was a distinction without
commitment.
249
a difference, but it may serve the state’s interest in preserving
open-mindedness—not in the sense of having no preconceptions—
but of being open to persuasion. Although Justice Ginsburg thought
this easily evaded, the very need for a judge to remain committed to
listen may underscore institutional constraints related to opinion
writing and the consideration of evidence and arguments.
2.

Statements of Bias Against Classes of Litigants

Although White quite clearly suggests that statements of a
candidate’s legal or political views do not create due process
244. See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003); Rachel Paine
Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 625 (2005).
245. Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 196 P.3d 1162, 1176 (Kan. 2008).
246. Id.
247. Friedland, supra note 169, at 596.
248. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002).
249. Id. at 819–20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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250

problems, it remains the case that bias against a litigant—at least
based on extra record sources—might. To what extent can this
interest be expanded to a class of litigants? There are certainly
ways in which it can be. Bias against a “suspect class” or on a
“suspect basis”—i.e., race, gender, ethnicity, religion—might require
recusal. The Court has, for example, said that a judge’s statement
that “‘[o]ne must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not [to be]
prejudiced against the German Americans’ because their ‘hearts are
251
reeking with disloyalty’” constituted disqualifying bias (albeit on a
252
statutory basis) in an espionage case against ethnic Germans.
More recently, a judge was disciplined for what were regarded to be
253
biased statements against white people.
But again, the matter is not simple. The Mississippi Supreme
Court, for example, refused to discipline a judge who wrote a letter
to a newspaper in which he said that “gays and lesbians should be
put in some type of mental institute” and who told a radio
interviewer that homosexuality was a disease that required
254
The judge had claimed that
treatment, rather than punishment.
these views were rooted in his Christian beliefs, and the court
255
The court
indeed found them to be constitutionally protected.
observed (without addressing the merits) that the judge would
“doubtless face a recusal motion from every gay and lesbian citizen
256
who visits his court.”
It may be easy to conclude that there would be a duty for this
judge to recuse himself from matters involving gay or lesbian
litigants, but it is not hard to imagine a more difficult case, such as
a statement on the part of a judge opposing same-sex marriage or
affirming “traditional” sexual morality. One is also reminded of our
ongoing debates over whether certain statements and positions are
257
In my view, this difficulty, while real, is unlikely
implicitly racist.
to prove unmanageable. We can expect most judges to stay well
clear of the line, and it is, in any event, a line that courts—who must
often address allegations of discriminatory intent—have
250. Id. at 776–78.
251. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921)).
252. Berger, 255 U.S. at 36.
253. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 11 So. 3d 107, 109,
118 (Miss. 2009) (quoting Judge Osborne as follows: “White folks don’t praise
you unless you’re a damn fool. Unless they think they can use you. If you have
your own mind and know what you’re doing, they don’t want you around.”).
254. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006,
1008–09, 1016 (Miss. 2004).
255. Id. at 1013–16.
256. Id. at 1015.
257. Indeed, some have argued that certain ads at issue in the Gableman
recusal motions were implicitly racist. See Felicia Thomas-Lynn, NAACP
Decries Campaign Ad, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Mar. 18, 2008),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/29497054.html.
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traditionally policed.
A larger problem is the potential for recasting statements of
position as statements of bias. Criminal defendants—or, for that
matter, defendants in products liability cases—often face a common
set of legal issues on which jurists may reasonably differ. Judges
may differ in their assessments of the rights claims of defendants
based on interpretive method, assumptions regarding the way in
which power is exercised in society, differences in confidence
regarding the adjudicative process, and varying judgments about
the proper balance to be struck between collective security and
individual liberty. Judges’ differing views on products liability may
be rooted in disagreements concerning the efficacy of markets or the
capacity of the legal system to efficiently allocate the costs of
injuries without creating economic inefficiency.
These sound
suspiciously like the differing perspectives on legal and political
issues that do not create a constitutionally significant risk of
impartiality.
But complications will inevitably arise from the nature of
political speech. A candidate or her supporters are unlikely to
produce a thirty-second spot in which the candidate says that, in her
view, courts have gone beyond the original meaning and intent of
the protection against self-incrimination and struck an improper
balance between the desire to ensure voluntary confessions and the
needs of effective law enforcement. In campaign ads directed
toward voters whose understandings and (perhaps more
importantly) attention spans are limited, she is likely to say
something more like that the court has coddled criminals and that
she will be tougher. A candidate will probably not explain that her
opponent has failed to appreciate the need to allocate the cost of
injuries caused by prescription medicines to drug manufacturers so
that they can be spread across all users. She may well say that he is
“in the pocket” of the drug companies.
One might argue that such statements constitute bias in White’s
first sense, i.e., they create the appearance of bias against a class of
litigants rather than a predisposition toward a particular legal
position. If we believe that recusal is a more limited restriction on
speech than discipline, then it would certainly seem that recusal is
both a permissible—and potentially constitutionally mandated—
remedy for statements that are claimed to express an impermissible
potential for bias against a class of litigants, e.g., claims of bias
against criminal defendants.
There is some authority for this. In a pre-White case, a judge
was disciplined (albeit only with a warning) for stating that he was
“very tough on crimes” when there are victims who have been
258
physically harmed and that he had “no feelings for the criminal.”
258. See Bruce Hight, Judge Violated Conduct Code, Panel Decides, AUSTIN
AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 31, 2001, at B1 (describing Texas Court of Criminal
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In a post-White matter, a judge was disciplined for distributing
leaflets that stated, “your police officers expect judges to take their
testimony seriously and to help law enforcement by putting
criminals where they belong . . . behind bars!” and “[a]bove all else,
259
In another
[the candidate] identifies with the victims of crime.”
case, a judge was publicly censured for saying that “[w]e need a city
court judge who will work together with our local police department
to help return Lockport to the city it once was,” and suggesting that
260
a judge should use bail and sentencing to deter crime.
But this seems to go too far. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Lavoie, for example, the Court concluded that allegations of a
judge’s general hostility toward insurance companies did not compel
261
“[O]nly in the most extreme of cases,” it observed,
his recusal.
“would disqualification [for bias or prejudice] be constitutionally
262
Thirty-second ads criticizing a decision excluding
required.”
evidence or failing to uphold a verdict in favor of a seriously injured
plaintiff will leave much unsaid. But that is in the nature of
politics, and the ads are constitutionally protected, given a state’s
choice to elect judges and White’s limitation of the state interest in
preventing bias. To require a judge who, in White’s language, is
“communicating relevant information to voters during an election”
from sitting on cases in which that “relevant information” matters
would render White’s protection of campaign speech for judicial
candidates chimerical and would be wholly inconsistent with White’s
foundational premises concerning the judicial role.
3.

Statements of Refusal To Follow the Law

An additional (and perhaps more serious) objection to much
judicial campaign speech—particularly promises to be “tough on
crime”—is that it rarely addresses the legal issues that ought to
control the disposition of cases. Judges are castigated for using
“loopholes” to release defendants without regard to the strength or
263
That the “loophole” may have
weakness of the defendants’ claims.
Appeals Judge Tom Price’s campaign statements).
259. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87–89 (Fla. 2003) (alteration in original)
(finding judge violated state code of judicial conduct and punishing her with
censure and fine).
260. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 3–5 (N.Y. 2003). The candidate also sent
out a letter to law enforcement personnel asking for their support in “put[ting]
a real prosecutor on the bench,” and stating that “[w]e need a judge who will
assist our law enforcement officers as they aggressively work towards cleaning
up our city streets.” Id. at 2.
261. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820–21 (1986).
262. Id. at 821.
263. See Andrew Clevenger, Roane Judge Dismisses Priest’s 1991
GAZETTE
(Aug.
30,
2010),
Molestation
Charges,
CHARLESTON
http://wvgazette.com/News/201008300958 (“[I]t’s important that suspected child
predators not walk free because of legal technicalities.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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consisted of an important constitutional guarantee or that the result
was mandated by decisions of the United States Supreme Court is
unlikely to become part of the broad public debate. Terms like
“loophole” become shorthand for a legal position that has an
undesired consequence and, although the speaker may have
something more than a consequentialist objection, whatever that is
goes unexplained. In this, judicial campaigns reflect political
advertising in general, which is characterized by gross
oversimplification and, when addressing the positions of an
opponent, by bad faith. If sufficiently egregious, this could lead to a
probability of bias sufficient to warrant recusal.
The controversy concerning the recusal of Wisconsin Supreme
Court Justice Michael Gableman illustrates the problem. The
Gableman campaign ran a much-criticized ad attacking his
opponent, incumbent Justice Louis Butler, for representing a
264
The ad, now the subject of a disciplinary
convicted rapist.
265
proceeding against Justice Gableman, said that “Butler found a
266
In fact, the
loophole” and the rapist went on to offend again.
“loophole” that Butler found was held to be harmless error and his
267
Gableman
client offended only after serving a prison term.
generally promised to be tough on crime, and both he and
independent supporters repeatedly referred to the fact that Butler
had been a public defender and had earned the nickname “Loophole
264. The audio text of the ad was as follows:
Unbelievable. Shadowy special interests supporting Louis Butler are
attacking Judge Michael Gableman. It’s not true! Judge, District
Attorney Michael Gableman has committed his life to locking up
criminals to keep families safe—putting child molesters behind bars
for over one hundred years. Louis Butler worked to put criminals on
the street. Like Reuben Lee Mitchell, who raped an eleven-year-old
girl with learning disabilities. Butler found a loophole. Mitchell went
on to molest another child. Can Wisconsin families feel safe with
Louis Butler on the Supreme Court?
GreaterWisComm, Gableman Attack Ad, YOUTUBE (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8GquEW0XKcA.
265. A three-judge panel recommended that the complaint be dismissed. See
Wis. Judicial Comm. v. Gableman (In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings
Against the Honorable Michael J. Gableman), No. 2008AP2458-J, at 3–4 (Wis.
June 30, 2010). That recommendation is now before the entire Wisconsin
Supreme Court. In a possibly ironic twist, Justice Gableman moved to recuse
Justice Patrick Crooks for statements made in his writing in the case
addressing the recusal motions. Justice Crooks denied the motion. Patrick
Marley, Justice Crooks To Stay on Gableman Ethics Case, MILWAUKEE-WIS. J.,
SENTINEL (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/89463092
.html.
266. Bill Lueders, Gableman—Unfit for Any Office, ISTHMUS: THE DAILY
PAGE (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.thedailypage.com/isthmus/article.php
?article=22072.
267. Marcia Coyle, Judicial Campaign Speech Case May Be Destined for
Supreme Court, LAW.COM (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp
?id=1202433962977.
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268

Louie.”
The recusal motions have argued that these ads reflect a
269
prejudice against a specific class of litigants—criminal defendants.
It is bias in White’s first sense and can certainly form the basis for
recusal. Although I think the ad was misleading and unfair, I am
not convinced that it warrants recusal.
“Tough-on-crime”
campaigning reflects, however crudely, a normative position that
courts have used their discretion in a way that provides too much
protection to criminal defendants.
Judges do differ on such
questions and, after White, they are entitled to communicate those
differences to the voters.
If there is a problem with tough-on-crime campaigning, it is
that it suggests that a judge won’t follow the law, i.e., that a judge
will rule against criminal defendants regardless of what the law
requires. But given the limits and mores of campaigning, a duty to
recuse would seem to require an extraordinarily direct and broad
statement of bias against defendants as a class. At minimum, the
key may be whether a statement can be read as a statement of legal
position (“my opponents sentences are too light,” or even “my
opponent unnecessarily finds loopholes that allow criminals to go
free”) as opposed to being a clear statement of bias (“the testimony
of law enforcement officers should be believed”) or of a refusal to
consider what the law may require to be taken into account (“I have
270
no feeling for the criminal”).
B.

Campaign Support and Recusal
1.

Expenditures Are of Less Concern Than Are Contributions

Although Caperton involved, for the most part, independent
271
272
and White concerned candidate speech,
robust
expenditures,
constitutional protection of campaign speech is not limited to
candidates. It will presumably take an extraordinary and extreme
independent effort to lead to a duty of recusal. As noted above, the
Court has long distinguished between expenditures and
contributions, holding that the former does not present the same

268. Hijacking Justice 2008: Issue Ads in the 2008 Supreme Court
Campaign, WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.wisdc.org
/hijackjustice08issueads.php.
269. See, e.g., Motion for Recusal of the Honorable Michael Gableman on
Constitutional Grounds at 28, State v. Carter, No. 2006AP1811-CR (Wis. 2009),
available at http://www.wisspd.org/html/appellate/CCRM.pdf.
270. Although I criticized the Mitchell ad at the time it was aired, see Rick
Esenberg, Supreme Court Ads, SHARK & SHEPHERD (Mar. 17, 2008, 7:40 PM),
http://sharkandshepherd.blogspot.com/2008/03/supreme-court-ads.html, I am
not persuaded that it, even in combination with other ads and communications
in the race, amounts to such a statement of bias.
271. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
272. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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273

potential for actual or apparent corruption.
Although Justice
Kennedy repeatedly elided the distinction between contributions
274
and expenditures in Caperton, the recent reaffirmation in Citizens
United of the notion that “independent expenditures, including
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
275
appearance of corruption” suggests that independent expenditures
ought to be less likely to lead to a duty of recusal.
Smith and Hoersting argue that the interest in preventing
actual or apparent judicial bias is a more narrow interest than the
interest in preventing the corruption—or its appearance—thought to
276
Bias, they say,
justify restrictions on campaign expenditures.
requires “a direct, substantial, personal or pecuniary interest in
277
Corruption,
reaching a conclusion against [a litigant in a] case.”
they argue, is a necessarily broader concept because bribery is
278
Although the state apparently has an interest in
already illegal.
preventing the appearance of an improper quid pro quo, they argue
that, if independent expenditures cannot give rise to the appearance
of corruption, then such expenditures certainly cannot give rise to
279
the appearance of bias.
It is not clear, after Caperton, that disqualifying judicial bias is
a narrower concept than the type of corruption thought to support
restrictions on campaign contributions in general. But the “debt of
gratitude” that may be owed to, at least, the support of an
independent group representing a particular interest or point of
view (as opposed to, as Justice Kennedy seemed to see it, being
virtually an alter ego of a particular party with a private interest) is
indistinguishable from the type of pressure that may flow from a
judge’s recognition of who supports her and how those supporters’
behavior may impact future elections.
2.

The Type of Party

There are at least two issues here. The first is whether an
interested party might not be the litigant, but instead some
organization or aggregate of organizations or individuals with an
interest in the outcome of a case. Assume, for example, that a
business organization or association of trial lawyers has strongly
supported a particular party. It is likely that there is—or will be—a
case in which such an organization is interested. The difficulty with
273. See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 491 & n.3 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1976).
274. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 263–64.
275. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884 (2010).
276. Hoersting & Smith, supra note 52, at 340.
277. Id. at 328 (alteration in original) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
523 (1927)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986).
278. Hoersting & Smith, supra note 52, at 340.
279. See id. at 340–41.
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requiring recusal in such cases is that it is a principle that is at war
with judicial elections. If a candidate has been strongly supported
by individual trial lawyers or business organizations in a sufficient
amount, there is no reason to think that the “debt of gratitude” will
be any less compelling than would be support from an organized
association of trial lawyers or businesses. If that’s right, then the
principle turns out to be an admonition against ruling on a case in
which an interest group that has strongly supported a candidate has
an interest. Again, this seems inconsistent with the rule from
White: the view that the mere fact that a decision may have political
consequences does not create due process concerns of sufficient
gravity to justify the restriction of speech.
A more limited duty would presumably turn on the amount of
support provided. But interest groups are more likely to be able to
provide large amounts of support. Indeed, in Caperton itself, trial
lawyers were able to spend an amount that was less than, but
comparable to, the putatively extraordinary levels of support
280
More fundamentally, that support is
provided by Blankenship.
likely to be based on a candidate’s perceived sympathy for a view of
the law favored by the interest group. The form of bias likely to
arise from interest-group support, then, is likely to be a perceived
inclination toward a particular legal or political position. As we
have seen, such an interest is not sufficiently compelling or
threatening to due process to support a duty of recusal. It seems
likely that recusal based on independent expenditures will—or
should be—limited to large expenditures by individual parties with
a particular matter that is pending or imminent.
3.

Type of Support

In theory, there is no reason that endorsements—particularly
by a large group—cannot create the same type of “debt of gratitude”
that was of concern in Caperton. Ironically, the value of such
endorsements may become more substantial if mandatory recusal or
other limitations on campaign expenditures reduces the ability of
individuals and groups to directly support or engage in campaign
communication. The “signaling” effect of endorsements (along with
the organizational support that many organizations can provide,
including mobilization of their own members) will become more
important. Certainly, this type of support can lead to feelings of a
“debt of gratitude” or to an incentive to rule in a particular way to
keep or obtain such support. Indeed, the literature suggests that
endorsements and organizational support are critical in low-turnout,
281
low-salience elections.
280. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009).
281. See, e.g., Charles Kuffner, Analyzing the Republican Judicial
Primaries, KUFF’S WORLD (May 7, 2010), http://blogs.chron.com/kuffsworld
/2010/05/analyzing_the_republican_judic.html; Charles Kuffner, Another
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As with expenditures, there is no reason to limit the potential
for due process recusal to circumstances in which an interested
litigant supported a judge. The potential for apparent impropriety
or an unacceptable probability of bias is just as likely to stem from
opposition to a judge as from support for a judge. In addition, if
First Amendment concerns are not thought to place significant
restrictions on Caperton recusal, there is no reason to believe that a
duty of recusal cannot flow from media endorsements in cases in
which an endorsing media entity is interested or, depending on how
broadly we define an “interest,” is one in which it has taken a
position.
But to recognize Caperton recusal in such cases would be wholly
inconsistent with the framework suggested here. The fact that
Caperton could be read to apply in such instances further supports
the need for a limited reading of its scope.
4.

Imminence of Case

One final question might relate to whether the case in which
recusal is sought was imminent or anticipated at the time that the
campaign support was provided or that the communications were
made. It would seem that the appearance of impropriety is
strongest when a party who has provided campaign support knew or
282
reasonably anticipated an important case coming before the court.
In the absence of such a case, the support looks more like
generalized political support that ought not to form the basis for a
duty to recuse. This is less clear with campaign speech that either
evinces an impermissible bias against a particular party or group or
a refusal to apply the law. While the imminence of a case may
contribute to the appearance of a quid pro quo or “debt of gratitude,”
the shelf life of an expression of impermissible bias would seem to be
longer.
CONCLUSION
If, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested in dissent, Caperton is a
283
hard case that made bad law, the remedy lies within the Court’s
own recent jurisprudence regarding the relationship between
judicial elections and judicial independence and the First
Amendment rights of citizens to participate in the electoral process.
It is these cases, and not the unusual nature of Caperton itself, that
provide the limits that the Caperton majority did not.

Analysis of the Democratic Judicial Primaries, OFF THE KUFF (Apr. 6, 2010),
http://offthekuff.com/wp/?p=27265.
282. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264 (“The temporal relationship between
the campaign contributions, the justice’s election, and the pendency of the case
is also critical.”).
283. Id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

